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The Postwar and the Proto-Postmodern
Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, in
quiet. I would take up residence underground. The end was in the beginning.
—Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man
While the meaning of Ralph Ellison’s concluding remark to his 1952 novel leaves a sort
of Gordian knot for readers to untangle, the text clarifies at least one point: “here” is
underground, a sanctuary for the narrator as he retreats from a society that renders him invisible.
Like the entirety of the novel, though, the who—the “human” identity—that takes refuge remains
indeterminable, since the narratives of the past—whether Booker T. Washington’s or W.E.B Du
Bois’s ideals of racial uplift, trade unionism or bootstrap individualism, or, ultimately, racial
Nationalism or Marxism—continually name and rename the invisible man’s identity, offering
him a place in the chain of history(s) they say will guarantee emancipation. By staging the novel
as a frustrated search for visibility and recognition within these histories that constantly leave the
“I” in flux, Ellison’s account of “invisibility” not only serves as an aesthetic expression of Du
Bois’s “double consciousness,” but it also provides a term to make the erasure of his dignity
intelligible. To cope with this revelation, the “invisible man” thus takes sanctuary to think and
sort out the question, “And what shall I do now?”
Like the “invisible man” of Ellison’s novel, Western civilization after World War II
undergoes a process of reevaluation that is essentially ethical and political in character, prompted
by the crises of systemic violence. After the horrors of the Nazi regime, whether its external
pursuit of European conquest through warfare or the Holocaust, modernity’s ethical framework
of Humanism—”the philosophical champion of human freedom and dignity” that “assumes an
unchanging, wholly self-aware [and rational] subject unaffected by exterior forces”—and its
narrative of Progress and human perfectibility (both “metanarratives”) ring hollow because of
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their complicity with genocide (Davies 5; Holland 4-5). With Nazism’s racial narrative of Aryan
supremacy driving and legitimating a systematized form of violence, Humanism’s central
concept of “humanity” begins to unravel because of totalitarianism’s ability to conduct such
mass degradation of human dignity while espousing the humanist ideal of rationality. Put more
succinctly, Tony Davies writes in Humanism that “[i]n the face of [systematized violence] … not
only humanism … but the very notion of the human was called to account” (51). Similar ethical
questions are raised surrounding Harry S. Truman’s decision to annihilate two Japanese cities
with products of state-sponsored science, introducing the world into the atomic age and setting
the stage for a geopolitical standoff between Capitalism and Communism that will define the
remainder of the century.
Out of this destruction, the Allied victory, and the introduction of the atomic bomb, a new
political paradigm emerges where a dualistic balance of power between the United States and the
USSR dominates. As Jeffrey Nealon suggests in Post-Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of
Just-in-Time Capitalism, this global context shapes and defines the theories and theorists that
will later be labelled “postmodern.”1 Postmodern thought, as Nealon sees it, is defined by its
attempt “to find a kind of ‘third way’” between the positions presented by “American
consumerism on one side and Russian communism on the other,” and from this search for a third
form of engagement with the world, he claims an underlying “open/closed” binary emerges in
postmodernism (120). For postmodern thinkers, political choices and allegiances coincide either
with “openness and possibility” or “rigid, inflexible, univocal standard[s] of value or right,” and
the postmodern perspective identifies the either/or of Capitalism versus Communism, of liberal
versus social humanisms, with such univocality (120–1).2 Such a conception of the world
prompts a departure from the humanisms, shifting toward an epistemology based on the
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indeterminacy of knowledge, language, and their relationship to authority in order to reevaluate
modern ethical thought.
While this ethical aim runs contrary to the “advoca[cy] … [of] moral nihilism” that A.T.
Nuyen describes as the preliminary understanding of postmodernism (“Normative Question”
411), postmodern thought advocates decoupling ethics from modern concepts of “humanity” and
the metanarratives modern humanists use to legitimate their claims because, according to
postmodernists, such constructions ultimately service hierarchical social relations. In terms of
Nealon’s binary, then, “openness” represents a “linguistic turn” toward what critics such as
Davies call philosophical “anti-humanism,” while modern humanism occupies the “closed”
position of totality and universality because of its assuredness of the immutability of . Although,
as Alan Schrift claims in Twentieth-Century French Philosophy, the theories of Michel Foucault,
one of the prominent intellectual figures in the postmodern reevaluation of modern ethics, are
“less an anti-humanism than an attempt to think humanism and the subject after the end of
(modern) man” (63). “Far from being a thinker of ‘the death of the subject,” Schrift argues,
“Foucault simply refuses to accept the subject as given, as the foundation for ethical and rational
thinking” (63). Apart from the modern view, Foucault views a matrix of knowledge and power
structures, constructed through language, as the “ethical center” rather than the individual (or
subject). While concerned with the human subject like the moderns and not completely “antihumanist,” postmodern theory’s emphasis on the subject’s constructedness and the privileging of
structures in the formation of ethical thought still demarcates a dividing line between
modernity’s “ethics of the individual” and postmodernity’s “ethics of the structure.”
When we return to the cultural and intellectual climate of the post-war and early
postmodern period, however, theories and literatures of the time complicate such a clean binary.
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If we accept Jean-François Lyotard’s claim in The Postmodern Condition that postmodernity is
marked by an “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv), works by Hannah Arendt, Albert
Camus, Ralph Ellison, Joseph Heller, and Kurt Vonnegut also reside in the period we have come
to understand as “the postmodern” because of their critical engagement with the ideological
constructs fueling the engines of the Cold War, carving out a period in late modernity I am
calling the “proto-postmodern.” Unlike Lyotard and poststructuralists such as Jacques Derrida
and Michel Foucault, these writers remain invested in the modern humanistic concepts of ethics
and human dignity yet simultaneously struggle with the violence modernity produces in its
political and social organizations, thereby blurring the open/closed binary of political and ethical
commitment. Caught between modernity’s introduction (the ethical ideals of uplifting the human
community out of authoritarian structures) and its conclusion (the dehumanization of entire
populations caused by intensified forms of modern ethical thought), they search for ways to
salvage humanist values and reorient modernity’s ethical code as society departs from the postwar and enters the Cold War, but without falling back into the same authoritative totalizations
typical of modernity. Although, as Ellison’s closing line to Invisible Man reminds us, the protopostmodern attempt to revitalize aspects of humanism, when faced with its violent consequences,
leads into a cycle of despairing yet hopeful contemplation both of the past and present.
In order to explore the Sisyphean nature of the pursuit to rethink humanism without
discarding it, my essay first discusses the modern/postmodern binary as framed in the terms of
humanism and anti-humanism, respectively, which emphasizes the hybridity of protopostmodernism and the possibilities that it opens for reevaluating modern ethics from an ethical
and committed standpoint. Although the term “anti-humanist” prevails in criticism surrounding
the differences of the modern and postmodern, I propose that the student rebellions of 1968
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demonstrate the inapplicability of this term when we consider the intersection of Ihab Hassan’s
belief that the events of 1968 were the beginnings of the postmodern spirit and the students’
hybrid stance on humanism. Rather, these events express a “counter-humanism” that desires a
(post)modern humanism and underscores the political commitment of proto-postmodernism: in
other words, a “humanistic counter-humanism” still explicitly concerned with the value of
dignity as well as ethical and political questions. After surveying 1968, I examine the periodizing
work of literary and cultural critics such as Fredric Jameson, Linda Hutcheon, Robert Genter,
Andreas Huyssen, and Tony Davies to situate the proto-postmodern writers in terms of
modern/postmodern ethical and political commitments. Against this critical backdrop, protopostmodernism represents an in-between of the (postmodern) questioning and the (modern)
committed stances because it interrogates how modern humanism’s ethics spawned its opposite
(anti-humanism), yet also attempts to reforge ethics in light of postwar crises as one of its central
tasks. Because of their specific concern with violence, the proto-postmoderns resist a retreat into
the reductionist casting of humanity in the “linguistic turn” that the postmoderns express in their
theory and fiction, but they criticize the unfettered belief in the modern idea of progress and selfcentric ethical thought as well.
Following this section, I detail the counter-humanist side of proto-postmodern texts as
they write and theorize delegitimation on an ethical and political level and redefine “antihumanism” in connection with the metanarratives of modern humanism. Beginning with an
exploration of the famous quarrel between Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus to further our
understanding of the French political context out of which poststructuralism arose, this section
on the proto-postmodern resistance to anti-humanism uses Lyotard’s definitions of
metanarratives and his theory on its legitimating function to introduce Hannah Arendt’s and
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Albert Camus’s understanding of totalitarianism and its connection to modern humanism’s
metanarratives. Providing a complementary reading of this “post” of the postmodern by
explicating the link between metanarratives and the legitimation violence, Arendt and Camus’s
ethico-political incredulity toward totalitarianism illustrates the destructive capacities of modern
humanism’s totalizing ethics, which attempts to enforce through terror an abstract logic—or
metanarrative—despite the chaotic world of human spontaneity that guarantees human dignity.
Through Arendt’s theory, I draw connections between totalitarian logicality, ideology, and
systematic violence, exposing modern humanism’s complicity in violence through its
metanarratives and its fundamentally anti-humanist character. In the latter part of this section,
Camus’s deconstruction of Marxism in The Rebel connects its metanarrative to the metanarrative
of capitalism, which explicates how “progress” in terms of capitalist techno-science plays a
fundamental role in Marxism’s thought and the violence of Stalinism. Interspersed in the
discussion of these theories, Ellison’s Invisible Man and Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle supplement
the theories of Arendt and Camus with metaphorical examples of these modern forces at work,
performing similar political deconstructions as Arendt and Camus in their fiction.
After defining the contours of modern humanism’s anti-humanism through the
connection between metanarratives and totalitarianism, the final section interprets the humanistic
rebellions against American forms of anti-humanism Ellison, Vonnegut, and Heller conduct in
their literature. Forefronting their novels with a negation of violence and the sacrifice of dignity
in these modern ethical frameworks, the proto-postmodern novelists also affirm the necessity of
ethical thought because of its role in preserving human dignity. Using Camus’s concept of the
absurd “gap” as a theoretical tool, I examine how these proto-postmodern novelists use absurdity
to expose the divide between American humanism’s claims to enrich collective human dignity
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and the violence it produces in the world. Afterward, Arendt’s concepts of the “two-in-one” and
“representative thought” provide a framework for interpreting the ethical, humanistic drive
underlying each novel, particularly in Vonnegut’s representation of the Hoenikker family in
Cat’s Cradle and the concept of “invisibility” in Invisible Man. With their representations of
unthinking characters, Vonnegut and Ellison draw the parallels between thinking, judging, and
action and the role the lack of conscientious and representative thought plays in abetting violence
and degrading human worth. In the last part of this section, I apply the established Arendtian
framework to explore the narrative monologue of Jean-Baptiste Clamence in Camus’s The Fall
in order to interpret key thematic elements in Heller’s Catch-22, such as the mental binding of
the monologic narrative form and the blurring of traditional concepts of judgment such as “guilt”
and “innocence.”
With World War II bringing the consequences of modern humanism’s metanarratives to
their logical extreme, manifested in totalitarianism and the Cold War either/or, proto-postmodern
theory and fiction expose the cracks within the logicality of modern humanism by using
humanist ethics to untangle the legitimacy of metanarratives and the violence they cause.
Conducting their interrogation in this way, by folding modernity back upon itself, the protopostmoderns thus rebel, in Camus’s sense of the term, against political modernity and its ethics,
whose legitimating rationales promise emancipation and dignity yet only guarantee death and
degradation. Using fiction as a means to explore the reasons we ought to compel ourselves into
thought and, therefore, revitalize our faculty of judgment, the proto-postmodern novelists look to
reassert the humanistic value of dignity that does not reproduce the binding and logical elements
of the metanarrative form of legitimation, demonstrating that a dismissal of modern humanism
does not necessitate a disavowal of ethics or values. Ultimately, the efforts of the proto-
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postmodernists suggest that the novel—as a communicative and representative medium of
human plurality—has the capacity to construct a new ethical framework for the postmodern era.
Because of the recent turn toward humanism in contemporary literature and theory, which Mary
K. Holland details in Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in Contemporary
American Literature, Arendt, Camus, Ellison, Heller, and Vonnegut hold a revived critical and
cultural importance as foundational figures for contemporary writers and theorists who want to
revitalize humanistic values yet temper them with a poststructural awareness of language.
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Complications in the Modern/Postmodern Binary:
Situating the Commitments of 1968 and Proto-Postmodernism
Even more surprising in this odd loyalty to the past is the New Left’s
seemingly unawareness of the extent to which the moral character of the
rebellion—now a widely accepted fact—clashes with its Marxian rhetoric.
—Hannah Arendt, On Violence
Despite the postmodern position that typically holds a deeply ingrained suspicion toward
humanism, Hannah Arendt’s observation in her 1969 essay On Violence of the global student
rebellions, particularly the New Left movement in the United States, complicates the neat
periodizing of postmodernism as an outright rejection of modern humanism. The postmodern
dismissal of modern humanism, as Geoffrey Harpham intimates in “Ethics,” comes from
theoretical discourse: “[A]ll the leading voices of the Theoretical Era [1968–87] … organized
their critiques of humanism as exposés of ethics…” (388). Harpham’s periodizing of this era,
where theory tackles humanism through unraveling its ethics, raises an interesting intersection
between what Arendt sees as humanism in the streets and what Harpham sees as anti-humanism
in the academy, which includes postmodern theorists such as Jameson, Irigaray, and Derrida.
Problematizing the contours of the postmodern further, Ihab Hassan writes in his concluding
essay of The Postmodern Turn that the migratory course of the term “postmodernism” from
American to European discourse suggests “the energizing matrix of postmodernism, if not its
origin, may have been the sixties in America, with all their liberationist and countercultural
tendencies” (215).3 If we accept Hassan’s assessment of the originary role the sixties play in the
postmodern, then a humanist stance marks the beginning of the postmodern era, yet antihumanism marks its theoretical position both concomitantly with the student rebellions of 1968
and in its aftermath. Thus, the multiplicity of stances on the “humanism question” problematizes
our concept of the dawn of postmodernity and the twilight of modernity. This contradiction in
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postmodern genealogy demands a rethinking of the way the events of 1968, the thought
influencing it, and the thought coming afterward are situated. Staging the humanism/antihumanism binary through the theoretical valencies of 1968 illustrates the complications the
periodizing framework of the modern/postmodern presents along ethical lines of thought.
Arendt’s analysis of the New Left and the global instances of rebellion offers a
preliminary understanding of the contradictory elements of 1968 that confuse, muddle, and resist
categorization. According to Arendt, the students’ “claim for ‘participatory democracy’”—while
“constitut[ing] the most significant common denominator of the rebellions in the East and the
West”—runs contrary to the ultimate aim of Marxist ideology, which seeks to wither away “the
need for public action and participation in public affairs” (Violence 22). Again, like their
moralistic and humanistic stance, the students espouse Marxist theory yet diverge from it in
practice. As Ronald Fraser notes in 1968, however, “Marx’s early writings … were [an]
important source of inspiration for many students” during the years leading up to 1968 (82).
Thus, the locus of the divorce between Marxist philosophy and the students ideals resides not in
a misinterpretation, as Arendt wants to suggest, but instead in the trajectory of Marx’s thought.
While outlining Louis Athusser’s “assault … on Marxist or socialist humanism,” Davies writes
that “the young Marx parted company with … humanistic premises and pieties [such as notions
of will, freedom or human potential]” and instead “formulated a model of history and society
based … on such ‘structural’ concepts as class, ideology, and the forces and relations of
production” (57-8). The students, then, influenced by Marx’s humanism during their
development divert from the structuralist Marx, whose thought only enters their rhetoric as
antagonisms intensified.4 The contradictions within the student movement between its cause and
its theory thus arise from the complexities and unresolved strains of Marxism because it can be
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divided against itself, and observers such as Arendt exacerbate these contradictions when they
attempt to force coherence between Marx’s structural and humanist conclusions, both of which
operate on fundamentally different premises and areas of analysis.
Analogous to the confusing variance between Marxist humanist and structural philosophy
in the student movements, their moralistic and political stance co-mingles enlightenment (or
bourgeois) and socialist humanisms. As Arendt adds to her analysis in On Violence, the students’
cause of participatory democracy embodies “the best in the revolutionary tradition—the council
system, the always defeated but only authentic outgrowth of every revolution since the
eighteenth century” (22). Analyzing the correlations between participatory democracy,
anarchism, and social movements, Shmuel Lederman in “Councils and Revolution” typifies
Arendt’s concept of revolutionary councils as “spontaneous associations of citizens … through
which they will be able to take part in determining the fate of their body politic and ‘govern
themselves’” (248). The language of spontaneity and self-governance resonates with the liberal
humanism of John Stuart Mill: mixing the idea of “liberty” with spontaneous action,
participatory democracy relies on a universal and essential “Man” that legitimates the
“revolutionary discourse of rights,” initiated by Rousseau and Paine, while simultaneously
staging a “‘romantic’ and anti-rationalist … revolt against the chilly despotism of enlightened
reason…” (Davies 26, 40).
The movements take the notion of romantic spontaneity further than Mill’s humanism,
extending the revolt against reason to Western capitalism and its humanist claims. In “The
Revolutionary Romanticism of May 1968,” Michael Löwry defines the spirit of the student
rebellions as a “revolutionary romanticism, [which] protest[s] against the foundations of the
modern industrial/capitalist civilization, its productivism and its consumerism” (950).
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“[R]ebell[ing] … in the name of past or premodern social and cultural values … against … the
triumph of mechanization, mercantilization, reification, quantification,” the students take a
fundamentally anti-capitalist stance according to Löwry (95). Like the major from Minnesota in
Heller’s Catch-22, the students incredulously demand the Milo Minderbinders of capitalism to
give society its share and take to the streets because they realize society has only received a
disdainful IOU on a “scrap of paper” (378). So while the students’ common platform of
participatory democracy reflects an enlightenment humanism, socialist values and socialist
critiques permeate their philosophical foundation alongside their humanistic ethical vision. This
vision subsumes the traditional concept of “liberty” in the liberal humanist tradition, which Mill
and other political thinkers saw as “guaranteed by reason and natural law” (Davies 40). Instead,
the students insist on an ideal of human dignity centered on its political, social, and economic
subjectivity rather than its rationality and notions of natural law. Echoing Marx, they advocate
for a humanism vying for “the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human,
being” (qtd. in Davies 12), because they base their values on a “concept of socialist freedom …
consisting not only in the social reappropriation of the economy but in the individual’s power of
decision over his or her own life as well as that of society…” (Fraser 82). The guarantee of the
students’ concept of freedom is the very spontaneity that operates as an antithetical strain in
liberal humanist thought, which places human rationality in tension with its anti-rational reality.
Instead of employing transcendental laws of nature and the solitude of rationality to construct
their ideals, the students of 1968 privilege the irrational and spontaneous aspects of human
sociality as the guarantor of freedom and dignity. In other words, political and social existence,
or the interaction in the public realm where the self is constantly subject to the other yet still
validated through expression, defines the “human.”
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In this view, where the student rebellions act as a cultural and political sign of the advent
of postmodernity in the West, the two postmodern positions discussed here, protopostmodernism and the traditional postmodern view, are better understood as “counterhumanism” rather than “anti-humanism” because of their resistance to modern humanism’s
conception of the human subject and humanity generally. However, the students maintain the
human and the spontaneity of human subjectivity as central to its thinking, similar to its modern,
liberal humanist predecessors, yet reject the totalization of modern humanism’s belief in Reason
that dehumanizes people under Capitalism and Stalinism, similar to the postmodern position. For
this reason, Hassan proclaims “[d]issent was part of the motive” of the student movements while
“another … was visionary” (216). This optimistic dissent results from their simultaneous
resistance of the authoritarian aspects of the bourgeois and Marxist social orders as well as their
co-mingling of the liberatory elements of each ideology to construct a new humanism. To state
the students’ resistant optimism in different terms, the students—as proto-postmoderns—are
humanistically counter-humanist in their ethical and political thought, and although the
development of postmodern theory turns away from the humanistic ethics of protopostmodernism, the poststructuralists maintain the counter-humanism of the 1968 rebellions.
The juxtaposition of Hassan’s take on the sixities as a “post” of postmodernity and
Arendt’s explication of the students’ confounding ideological stance yields a premise for
comprehending a possible prologue to postmodernity, a proto-postmodernity. Emblematic of the
period, the ethical and political ideals of 1968 complicate the humanism/counter-humanism
binary critics use to differentiate between modernity and postmodernity because it rejects
modern humanism in its theoretical and immanent forms on the grounds of preserving the
spontaneity and contingency of human life, ultimately a different form of humanist thinking.
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From the proto-postmodern perspective, the ruling binary thus is totality/contingency rather than
humanism/counter-humanism, and this modification of the open/closed Cold War binary that
Nealon identifies with postmodern theory not only defines proto-postmodernism but also
indicates an in-between approach between modernism and postmodernism that simultaneously
reproduces and resists both in its aesthetics and ethics.
Aesthetically, the proto-postmodern position takes political commitment and action as
one of its fundamental concerns and struggles with the humanistic and modern idea of a “center”
from which one can speak, which diverges from the politics of postmodern literature. As Linda
Hutcheon says in The Politics of Postmodernism, the postmodern mode is “that of a complicitous
critique,” or the self-awareness that its resistance to ideology, which is inevitably bound to an
ideological framework, never fully resists but always reproduces it in some way (2). Rather than
developing an “effective theory of agency that enables a move into political action,” the
postmodern “works to ‘de-doxify’ our cultural representations and their undeniable political
import” (3). While it seems ridiculous to say any critique can operate without some measure of
complicity in the ideologies it resists, especially as this position has itself become “doxified,” the
complicitous critique self-sabotages itself by rendering it unable to move beyond the cognizance
of its own complicity. Its de-doxifying exigency commands that the work participate in an
endless loop of reproduction and subversion, making and unmaking. As Hutcheon notes, “If [the
work] finds [a totalized] vision, it questions how … it made it” (Poetics 48). Postmodern
literature thus questions endlessly in order to reveal the nature of its own textuality and its extratextual elements as wholly constructed.
On this point, proto-postmodernism focuses more intensely on its extra-textuality, its
relationship to the world and the political reality of its historical situation, to represent action or,
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at least, to call for action. For instance, Invisible Man externalizes the struggle between the
narrator’s “self” and subject positions as a “fight … with Monopolated Light & Power” (7). He
conducts this “act of sabotage” against a capitalist institution, in this case a monopolized utility,
in order “to carry on a fight against [those who make him invisible] without their realizing it”
because he sees “[his] old way of life” as “based upon the fallacious assumption that [he], like
other men, was visible” (5). The narrator feels as if he takes some of the power (literally and
figuratively) back from the society that renders him invisible when he decides to stop “the
routine process of buying service and paying their outrageous rates” (5). By contextualizing
(in)visibility with an anti-capitalist stance, Ellison forefronts his novel with a mode of agency,
offering readers an outlet of potential resistance for the battleground over the narrator’s own selfdefinition. Unlike a postmodern work, the novel does not deconstruct how his decision plays
back into capitalist life or question why he desires visibility. It asserts, “This is what I have
chosen,” and breaks out of the postmodern loop of indecision. Refusing to admit its interpellation
continuously, Invisible Man avoids questions such as, “Why do I desire visibility?” or “How
authentic is the visible I?” Rather, it rejects invisibility and tackles the question “How do I
become visible to others?”
Likewise, though to a lesser extent in its determinacy, Yossarian’s free indirect dialogue
as he contemplates his own complicity in Nately’s death, hinting at Heller’s own stance, calls for
action:
Yossarian thought he knew why Nately’s whore held him responsible for Nately’s
death and wanted to kill him. Why the hell shouldn’t she? It was a man’s world,
and she and everyone younger had every right to blame him and everyone older
for every unnatural tragedy that befell them; just as she, even in her grief, was to
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blame for every man-made misery that landed on her kid sister and on all other
children behind her. Someone had to do something sometime. (414)
In this passage, Heller foregrounds the idea of complicity itself as the problem that necessitates
action. He recognizes “every man-made misery” is “unnatural” and constructed as do the
postmoderns, implying everyone’s complicity in these structures, but he also invests a faith in the
human capacity for reconstructing the world because Yossarian does not turn back and eternally
question the how and why behind such constructions and the complicity that follows. Unlike the
postmoderns, complicity is the premise, not the conclusion. Instead, Yossarian concludes that
someone has to act to make complicity in human-made structures more bearable and humane. If
we must always be complicit in our own constructions—the “human artifice,” as Arendt would
say, that is a product of spontaneous human actions—then Heller argues we need to ensure we
act in ways that construct a world where complicity does not degrade the dignity of the self or
the other.
The representation of action in Invisible Man and Catch-22’s call to construct a more
humane world aligns the politics of these novels more closely with Robert Genter’s “late
modernism” than with Hutcheon’s postmodernism. Contrary to the postmodern variation of
political engagement, Robert Genter, explicating the stance of late modernists in Late
Modernism: Art, Culture, and Politics in Cold War America, characterizes the commitment of
these writers as “one that refused to shy away from the notion that art at its essence was a form
of rhetoric, persuasion, and social communication” (12). In Genter’s formulation, the late
modernist literary work has an expressed and overt political purpose, acting as a medium to
communicate its message to the reader. The aim of this communicative art, in the opinion of
Kenneth Burke, who Genter sees as one of the critical exemplars of late modernism, demands the
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artist “to offer new forms of orientation, new ways of understanding modern experience, and
new sites of communion” because World War II destroyed common ethical and political
concepts that grounded the conventions of modernist engagement (3).
The last of these recastings of the modern project, the need for “new sites of
communion,” predicates the political commitment of proto-postmodernism as well as part of its
modern humanist parallels. According to Jeffrey Isaac in Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion,
Arendt and Camus take this call to reconstruct a common site for communication as the most
serious political task in the postwar world. As theorists, they look to “the promotion of dialogue
[as the] key to the creation of freer, more satisfying forms of politics” where “ethical standards
and public policies can be collectively agreed upon than arbitrarily imposed” (123-124).
Politically committed to “seeking foundations … [whose] provisional character…. [recognizes]
the enduring facts of human difference and plurality” (110, 124), Arendt and Camus advocate for
a polyvocal politics and ethics grounded in the unifying, rather than separating, aspects of
language because “totalitarianism exhibited a frightening and extreme form of human oppression
that sought to suppress all difference through the manipulation of language and the suffocation of
dialogue” (123). While their desire for unification hints at the totalizing excesses of modern
humanism, they conclude that the arbitrariness of totalitarian language necessitates meaningful,
referential language and ethical concepts based in pluralistic consensus in order to safeguard
human dignity. Analogous to the site of political unity that Arendt and Camus see in dialogic
communication, Heller and Ellison construct the novel as a place of communicative unification
for readers, one which uses the characters’ thoughts and actions as representations of the
potential for political engagement, whether against bureaucratic systems (Heller) or racial
oppression (Ellison). In their struggle to unify, they concoct a political language to ground their
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visions of resistance, exemplified by the titles of each novel, Catch-22 and Invisible Man. As
signifiers, both titles express a way to talk about political and social realities, common terms that
have moved into extra-literary discourse.5 Because of their commitment to represent the ailments
of their political context, these works are as much ethical as they are aesthetic, compelled by a
humanistic stance to question the world as they see it.
While Genter’s conception of “late modernism” has parallels with proto-postmodernism,
late modernism’s definition remains contested with a lingering debate over its political import
and aesthetic character. In Jameson’s view, the late modern—associated with the Cold War as in
Genter’s work—produces a “theory of art, the ideology of modernism [or abstract
expressionism] … which then accompanied [this theory of art] everywhere abroad as a
specifically North American cultural imperialism” (168). Jameson conceives of late modernism
as a calcified variant of high modernism where “experimentation” transforms “into an arsenal of
tried and true techniques, no longer striving after aesthetic totality or the systemic and Utopian
metamorphosis of forms” (166). While proto-postmodernism aligns more with Genter’s
optimistic late modernism, Jameson’s pessimism raises an important point, although his
conflation of late modernism with high modernism is problematic.6
According to Jameson, modernism in its traditional form “[holds] to the Absolute and to
Utopianism,” which he uses to classify Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot’s “extrapoetic, extraliterary
concerns” as “the sign that they were genuine modernists…” (168). While this focus on the
political has parallels in Genter’s late modernism, Jameson equates the period with a cultural
imperialistic purpose distinct from Genter’s:
Now, what was wanted in the West and in the Stalinist East alike, except for
revolutionary China, was a stabilization of the existing systems and an end to that
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form of properly modernist transformation enacted under the sign and slogan of
modernity as such…. Now the Absolutes of [high modernism] have been reduced
to the more basic programme of modernization – which is simply a new word for
that old thing, the bourgeois conception of progress. (166)
From an American imperialist standpoint, then, late modernism is to art what capitalism is to
industry and the economy. High modernism becomes “the way” to create, just as capitalism is
the way to produce and “representative” democracy is the way to organize the body politic.
Modernity and modernization in artistic, economic, and political forms thus equate with stasis, a
staid form of engagement reinforcing the Cold War political and economic paradigm. Jameson’s
characterization of late modernism separates the blurring of postmodernism’s complicitous
critique into a binary, that between the complicit and the critical, between the reproductive and
the transformative. It is on this point that Jameson and Genter argue: while Genter sees late
modernism as transformative and critical, Jameson views it as reproductive and complicit. On
the one hand, Jameson equates late modernism with an evolved and co-opted high modernism;
on the other, Genter claims modernism evolved its subversive politics to meet new challenges
and contexts.
When placing Genter against Jameson, the transformations Genter identifies in Cold War
American writing is the emergence of postmodernism (or proto-postmodernism) rather than a
continuation of modernism, which contradicts aspects of how the postmodern is typically
defined. As Lyotard argues in “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?,” the
postmodern “is undoubtedly a part of the modern” (79). Such a vague definition could be used to
support a claim that either the calcified high modernism or evolved politics of late modernism
are postmodern, but when Lyotard adds that “[a]ll that has been received, if only yesterday …
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must be suspected” (79), the questioning yet committed stance of the late modernists in Genter’s
thought makes them better candidates for being postmodern in Lyotard’s sense of the term than
Jameson’s complicit twin. However, Andreas Huyssen, in After the Great Divide, takes
Lyotard’s sweeping generalization to account for his conception of the postmodern. Untangling
the implication of Lyotard’s use of the Kantian sublime to ground his emphasis on the avantgarde, he calls attention to Lyotard’s contradictory “interest in rejecting representation, which is
linked to terror and totalitarianism,” and the inherent “desire of totality and representation”
contained in Kant’s concept of the sublime (215).7 For Huyssen, the divide between Lyotard’s
application of the sublime and his rejection of its philosophical underpinnings means “[his]
sublime can be read as an attempt to totalize the aesthetic realm by fusing it with all other
spheres of life…” (215). Here, Huyssen identifies the ultimate conflict in postmodern theory: it
ends up recasting the modern to the point where it produces Jameson’s late modernism, albeit in
different packaging. Indeed, Lyotard’s valorization of a totalized avant-garde plays directly into
the cultural imperialism Jameson sees in the abstract expressionism at the core of the ideology of
aesthetic modernism.
More generally, though, Huyssen comments that “French theory provides us primarily
with an archeology of modernity….not as a rejection of modernism, but rather as a retrospective
reading which … is fully aware of modernism’s limitations and failed political ambitions” (209).
If the continual modification of and reflection on the modern defines postmodern counterhumanism aesthetically and theoretically, then Lyotard certainly was correct in asserting that the
postmodern “is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state” (79), but defining the
postmodern in this way nullifies the “post-” signifying “after modernism.” Because the
postmodern remains trapped in a continuous struggle with its introspection on the modern, the
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self-awareness of its aesthetics and the counter-humanism of poststructuralist theory offers a
perspective that limits its own transformative power. Postmodernism provides tools for
understanding and conceiving the contours of modernity, but subverts its own commitment to
overcome and transgress the modern.
Because of postmodernism’s ultimately reproductive nature, proto-postmodernism
presents a hybrid third way between the (post)modern when considering ethics and critical
engagement with the modern, particularly between essentialist modern humanism and structureand language-centric postmodern counter-humanism. As Davies says in his introduction, “[T]he
question of humanism remains ideologically and conceptually central to modern – even to
‘postmodern’ – concerns” (5). Recalling Pound and Eliot, Jameson argues their allegiance to
Utopianism and the Absolute, ultimately abstract terms, marks them as “genuine modernists,”
and because this stance derives from the political engagement of their writing, these desires
reproduce the abstractions of political modernism. Davies explains that “abstract humanism, with
its universalist and essentialist conception of Man … is a political rather than philosophical
notion, deriving from the revolutionary discourse of rights” (25). He defines this abstract
humanism as essentialist “because humanity – human-ness – is the inseparable … defining
quality, of human beings” and universalist “because that essential humanity is shared by all
human beings, of whatever time or place” (24). This idea of a transcendent, absolute human
condition grounds the utopianism of the modernists, who attempt to encode individuated
emancipation from modern life into their writing and aesthetics. For the modernists, “self”expression becomes the primary site of political and ethical thought, a problematic centering
both from a postmodern and proto-postmodern standpoint.
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Postmodern counter-humanism rejects the abstract and essentialist vision of humanity the
modern humanists profess. As Hutcheon says in Poetics, “For many [postmodernists], it is the
‘rationally, universally valid’ ideas of our liberal humanist tradition that are being called into
question” (187), and as Davies notes, Friedrich Nietzsche inaugurates this questioning by
focusing on the “figurative nature of all statements” and the linguistic genesis of all matters
asserted as “truth” (36). With philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Foucault
following in Nietzsche’s footsteps—what Davies calls the “‘linguistic turn’” in philosophy—
they reveal how “the ‘humanity’ to which [modern humanism] appeals is nothing more than a
figure of speech, a metaphor so moribund and inert that we no longer recognise it as such…”
(37). Postmodern counter-humanism thus unravels the abstracted “self,” itself an instance of this
groundless metaphor, as well as abstracted “humanity,” yet it also maintains a faith in abstraction
like the modern humanists. Calling back to Althusser’s Marxist “anti-humanism,” Davies
articulates how his structuralism sees “the ‘subject’ … not [as] the individual human being,
speaking and acting purposively in a world illuminated by rational freedom, but the impersonal
… ‘forces and relations of production’… ‘operat[ing] outside man and independent of his will’”
(60). Similar to Althusser, Foucault’s concept of discourse, like “the relations of production for
Marx” or “ideology for Althusser,” centers on “capillary structur[es] of social cohesion and
conformity … [that] situat[e] us as individuals, and silently legislates the boundaries of what is
possible for us to think and say” (70). For postmodern counter-humanism, the center shifts from
the self to the structure. Unlike the modern humanist who sees the self wholly determining
identity through expression, the postmodern counter-humanist envisions the structure wholly
determining the identity of its subject by constructing and delimiting boundaries around the
subject’s action and thought.
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If politically engaged writing that faithfully adheres to a modern humanist notion of the
self as the ethical center characterizes modernism while postmodern counter-humanism
questions modern humanism through privileging structures that nullify such ideas about the self,
then what differentiates proto-postmodernism from either? In periodizing terms, the hybridity of
proto-postmodernism has many similarities with the way Genter classifies late modernism. He
argues that “Burke’s criticisms … predated what would become a larger revolt against the
aesthetic and epistemological assumptions of modernism … associated with the movement
known as postmodernism…” (3), and, on the level of conceiving the subject, “late modernists
saw the self as formed through a series of identificatory and linguistic practices … [yet] refused
to believe that the self was reducible to the context in which it was situated” (16). Wouldn’t this
critical, yet engaged, artistic position make proto-postmodernism just a rebranding of late
modernism? In a way, yes, but not necessarily. The crucial difference that differentiates the
proto-postmodernists from Burke is their shared preoccupation with the ethical questions that
violence provokes. For the proto-postmodernists, violence represents the fundamental
problematic of political living and modern humanism generally. and their theoretical and artistic
engagements center on disentangling the structures and abstractions that create violence and the
violence’s destructive impact on individual dignity, whether the self acting on the other or the
structure on the subject. On this point, proto-postmodernism overlaps with yet diverges from
postmodernism as well because it critiques modern humanist systems and structures because of
the violence it causes. However, the proto-postmodern writers frame their analyses and
representations of these structures with respect to ethics and political life, maintaining a
humanistic faith in individual autonomy and expressiveness because they envision language as a
site of unity rather than division and commit to promoting political action and ethical thought,

24

not just questioning. Despite their underlying humanistic compulsions, they view modern
humanism’s unbridled belief in the self’s expression and self-creation as a legitimating factor in
violence.
Arendt’s analysis of the students’ violent rhetoric and its genesis best encapsulates the
proto-postmodern rejection of modern humanism’s excesses and its advocacy of the limits of
humanistic agency.8 Pulling on the threads of the students’ principles, Arendt finds another
major divergence between the student rebels and Marxism besides its moralism: its glorification
of violence. Again, this contradictory exaltation points not to a misreading of Marx, but to the
complicated ground between abstraction and political reality in modern humanism. In “[t]he
strong Marxist rhetoric of the New Left,” Arendt sees “coincid[ing] with [this rhetoric] the
steady growth of the entirely non-Marxian conviction, proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung, that ‘Power
grows out of the barrel of a gun’” (Violence 11). While Arendt argues “Marx was aware of the
role of violence in history,” she reads him as placing it as “secondary” because “not violence but
the contradictions inherent in the old society brought about its end” (11). The turn of some of the
student factions post-1968 into believing in violence as a means of social change roots itself then
not in Marxist thought but rather, as Arendt outlines, the violence-as-ontology of Jean-Paul
Sartre and Franz Fanon (12-13, 19-21).9 She quotes Sartre via Fanon as saying “that
‘irrepressible violence … is man recreating himself,’” and she sees in his thought both “his basic
disagreement with Marx on the question of violence” as well as his investment in modern
humanism: “[T]he idea of man creating himself is strictly in the tradition of Hegelian and
Marxian thinking; it is the very basis of all leftist humanism” (12). A different take on the selfcentricity of aesthetic modernism, Sartre’s and Fanon’s theories take political subjectivity of the
individual as self-expression and self-creation through violence. Although they represent the
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extremes of leftist humanism, the theoretical stance espoused by Sartre and Fanon, which the
student rebels integrate into their thought, remains in the boundaries of modern humanism. On
one hand, it holds a political vision centered on the human subject and its formation, and yet, on
the other hand, the exigency of this formation requires the negation of the “other” through
violence, much like the logical abstractions of totalitarianism but on an individual, rather than
collective, level. The violent rhetoric in 1968 thus embodies an anti-humanist humansim, one
which remains humanist in its theoretical abstraction but calls for an “immanent anti-humanism”
to bring the self to fruition. In this instance, anti-humanist means serve modern humanist ends.
The ultimate end of this form of anti-humanism, the essence of its excess that legitimates
this violence for the proto-postmoderns, is Progress. As Arendt remarks, she believes the many
inconsistencies in the students’ “loyalty” to Marxism “has something to do with the concept of
Progress, with an unwillingness to part with a notion that used to unite Liberalism, Socialism,
and Communism into the ‘Left…’” (25). Tracing the trajectory of this concept, she describes
how at the “[b]eginning of the nineteenth century, all … limitations [to Progress] disappeared” as
its “movement” was conceived to have “neither beginning nor end” (26). The allure of Progress,
as Arendt sees it, is its ability “not only [to explain] the past without breaking up the time
continuum” but also to “serve as a guide for acting into the future….giv[ing] an answer to the
troublesome question, And what shall we do now?” (26). Progress settles the uncertainty of the
future because “nothing altogether new and totally unexpected can happen” (27). It reduces
social change, as with Marx or his revolutionary progeny Sartre and Fanon, or continual
development, as with the imperialist capitalism such revolutionaries resist, down to a
predetermined process. Unlimited Progress—the hangover of enlightenment and modern
humanism—acts as the common ground between these oppositional forces within humanism,
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fostering an ethical framework that legitimates any action, including violence and murder, that
will conceivably march their goals into the future. The final legitimating factor both for the
liberal humanist and its revolutionary counterpart is the metanarrative, whose center relies on
this notion of Progress. Although modern humanists defend their violent actions by invoking
metanarratives of human emancipation, an ideal that will come at some unforetold date in the
future, the ethical counter-humanism of proto-postmodernists such as Arendt and Camus expose
the illegitimacy of this claim because of its ties to totalitarianism and the infringements on
human dignity under Nazism and Stalinism.
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“Is There a Logic to the Point of Death?”:
Totalitarianism, Anti-Humanism, and Humanism’s Metanarratives
Indeed, if Prometheus were to reappear, modern man would treat him as the
gods did long ago: they would nail him to a rock, in the name of the very
humanism he was the first to symbolize.
—Albert Camus, “Prometheus in the Underworld”
The insanity Nazism represented within modernity’s ethical framework brought into
question collective faith in human progress and its modern humanistic origins. Its systematic
violence and abuse of authority predicated a fracturing of Western postwar society’s confidence
in modern humanism’s efficacy to prevent such trespasses against humanity, particularly for
France, whose intellectual and political climate birthed much of the groundwork for
poststructuralist theory. As Germaine Brée comments in her comparative critical biography
Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment, “[The Enlightenment] had been … a whole way of
looking at life that, for the French, 1914 had shaken and 1940 had shattered” (39). The political
fallout from the Occupation years recast the Enlightenment intellectual tradition as “a
dangerously illusory fiction if not a downright lie,” causing the philosophical framework of the
French intelligentsia to become “inextricably entangled in the process of reevaluation” (39). As
Brée presents it, Camus and Sartre “are a certain degree representative” of the work done in
untangling Enlightenment values as they “reoriented their thinking toward the social dimensions
of the individual” after exploring the modern themes of estrangement and alienation in their early
works (39-40). The failings of modern humanism’s self-centric ethics and their shared
experiences in the Resistance to Nazi occupation prompted their commitment to this new task
because modernist themes, engagements, and concepts, as Genter reminds us, could no longer
respond to the political demands of the time.
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Camus’s invocation of the Promethean myth in the context of humanism, going beyond
the symbolism of rebellion and revolt, lyrically calls attention to the divisions between his
politics and Sartre’s, a precursory statement to their feud over political violence that split them in
the 1950s. Leading into his claim about how his contemporaries would treat the mythical figure
in “Prometheus in the Underworld,” he argues Promethean humanism “believes that both souls
and bodies can be freed at the same time,” whereas “[m]an today believes that we must free the
body, even if the mind must suffer temporary death” (139). Although this essay was originally
published in 1947, it signals his stance on the constraints he sees underlying the abstractions of
Marxist thought that dominated French intellectual circles. Camus illustrates his objection to
Marxism most poignantly when he says, “[M]en today have chosen history … [b]ut instead of
mastering it, they agree a little more each day to be its slave” (140). Between this provocation
and the epigram’s claim, he highlights the troublesome relationship Marx’s philosophy has with
the humanism/counter-humanism binary we have constructed in retrospect: the proletariat
(humanity) is the agent of historical change, yet its agency will always remain subject to the
forces and movement (or narrative) of History. Such complexities and discontinuities in
Marxism’s relationship to modern humanism open the conceptual space for humanist values to
invert its professed ends of enriching and emancipating humanity collectively into ideas that
legitimate violence and anti-humanism.
When viewed from an ethical angle, “discontinuity” provides a language to understand
the humanistic ground from which proto-postmodern theorists’ critique Marx’s historical
understanding. For Arendt and Camus, it represents the unrelenting modern desire to give human
existence a dignified meaning in the wake of dethroning God and King. Camus asks in The
Rebel, “But if we are alone beneath the empty heavens, if we must die forever, how can we
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really exist?” (250). The moderns answer by “attempt[ing] to conquer a new existence” that lives
by the principle “to be was to act” in the hope of “fabricat[ing] an affirmative … dismissed until
the end of time” (250-251). As Arendt says in “The Concept of History,” conceiving history as a
process of fabricating a determined end is an attempt “to escape from the frustrations and
fragility of human action” driven by an inability “to cope with unpredictability” and “human
plurality” (303, 294). When Marxism turns history into History, it concocts a story that places
every action and event in a narrative chain progressing toward a predetermined end—an end that
achieves continuity and totality, a “closed universe” that realizes the end of history. However,
Arendt argues the process of fabricating this end could only come about through “[t]otal
conditioning” because of the spontaneous nature of human plurality and sociality (303).10 Due to
the discontinuities in the political world and history itself, Marxism thus necessitates methods of
enforcing the truth of its “metanarrative”—its claim of knowing the story behind humanity’s
collective emancipation—and as Arendt and Camus critique Stalinism’s totalitarian character,
they penetrate how its violence, logicality, and terror results from the aspiration to achieve the
Marxist metanarrative’s supposedly humanist and ethical end.
Although the term “metanarrative” furthers our understanding of Arendt’s and Camus’s
humanistic criticism of Stalinism, this philosophical concept originates with Jean-François
Lyotard’s epistemological work in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, which
does not explore modern humanism’s and the metanarrative’s complicity in totalitarian terror.
Thus, in order to understand why Lyotard overlooks the political ramifications of the
metanarrative as well as Camus’s exclusion from postmodern theory, a brief look into the Sartre
and Camus quarrel throughout the 1950s over Stalinism will explicate the Sartre/Camus binary’s
influence on the poststructuralist turn toward language, contextualizing the formative moments
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of postmodern counter-humanism. Although the poststructuralists sought a “third way” out of
Cold War politics, Charles Forsdick, in “Camus and Sartre: The Great Quarrel,” underscores
how both Camus and Sartre had their sights set on a similar third form of political engagement
between capitalism and communism, but the immediate and intense divisions in geopolitics
caused a fracture in their commitments:
In the political climate of the Cold War, with the collapse of any hopes of social
revolution in France, Sartre (and to a lesser extent Camus) had briefly flirted with
the idea of creating a third political force, the ‘Rassemblement démocratique et
révolutionnaire’. When this project faltered … Sartre … drifted towards the
French Communist Party (PCF); Camus … found himself increasingly unwilling
to align himself with any orthodoxy or common cause. (121)
Nealon’s “open/closed” binary and the search for a third way emerges here once again in
contraposition to the Cold War paradigm, but in the generation prior to the poststructuralists.
Unlike the postmodern counter-humanists, however, Camus and Sartre imagined this binary in
the context of their political situation rather than philosophically, seeking to form a political
movement apart from American capitalism and Soviet communism at first.11 Moreover, Brée
notes the influence Sartre’s and Camus’s writings had on students of the era, observing that “the
questions they had raised and the solutions they had adopted were … those debated by the
insurgent students” (41).12 Framing the political issues of the time, Sartre’s turn toward Marxism
and Camus’s resistance to its dominance on the left sketches the intellectual and philosophical
grounding of the two political positions of the student movements—the revolutionary and the
moralistic.
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However, like tumbling dominoes, their split along the boundaries of political violence
also foretells the doom of leftist opposition in the sixties. Deconstructing Sartre’s and Camus’s
“transform[ation] … into unapologetic Stalinist and reactionary apologist” stereotypes (Forsdick
122), Ronald Aronson in “Camus and Sartre on Violence” moderately describes how “[e]ach of
them … denounced a single dimension of contemporary violence, Camus targeting revolutionary
violence and Sartre targeting the violence structurally imposed by social systems based on
inequality” (68). Despite Aronson’s narrow reading of Camus, his insight into the ripples caused
by Camus and Sartre’s fallout on this issue, sparked by the publication of Camus’s Rebel in
1951, underscores the importance of this fracture in the French intelligentsia.13 He writes:
After their split the Cold War’s ‘either/or’ would dominate the Left…. Much of
the Left learned to justify one side or the other. Thus were the hopes of a
generation to move toward socialism and freedom … to be dashed. People on the
Left were pressured to make an impossible choice: between what became Sartre’s
grim realism (communism as the only path to meaningful change), and Camus’s
visceral rejection of communism…. Sartre and Camus voiced … the half-truths
and half-lies of what became the tragedy of the Left – not only in France but
across the world – for at least the next generation. Camus and Sartre came to
insist [through their literature] that there were only two alternatives: Camus’s
rebel and Sartre’s revolutionary. (72)
Their spat had wider reaching effects than just a crumbling friendship: it set the terms of the
Left’s counter-discourse through the Cold War period, constructing another political binary
reflective of the larger geopolitical context. In the wake of their argument, the Left became
fractured, factionalized around Arendt’s question, “And what shall we do now?” Modes of
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political engagement and ethical thought thus calcified along lines already demarcated by Cold
War geopolitics, and leftist dialogue closed off to the acceptance of either fighting for the
Stalinist model or the implicit continuation of American capitalism.
This backdrop of the Sartre/Camus political binary in France makes the poststructuralist
search for openness more intelligible because it explains how the failure of these existential
humanists to provide a tertiary mode of politics prompted the need for a new method of
engagement. Thus the turn toward epistemology and language as politics and ethics collapses
back on itself and reproduces modern forms of humanism. Even with this turn, political
questions are not completely loff the table: as Huyssen notes, “Lyotard,” one of the only French
theorists who has named and described the postmodern at length, “is a political thinker” (214).14
For Lyotard, who Alan Schrift notes was active in “third way” politics throughout the 1950s, the
language of modern humanism, which legitimated various forms of knowledge in the form of the
metanarrative during modernity, implicitly unravels into postmodernity.15 Despite his political
attitudes and concerns, Lyotard’s analyses never clarify the political reasons behind the decline
of metanarratives, and his oversight opens space for the proto-postmoderns to speak and
complement his work on the beginnings of the postmodern period.
While he indexes a series of political events that invalidate each metanarrative in
“Missive on Universal History,” counting Auschwitz and May 1968 among them (29), Lyotard
does not theorize a comprehensive framework that explains the political mechanisms of
metanarratives and their consequences. In “Marxism, Postmodernism, Zizek,” Brian Donahue
highlights this missing component when he writes how Lyotard’s epistemo-linguistic approach
“precludes the kind of large-scale analyses that would allow adequate attempts to elaborate
connections between the … theory he proposes and the social, economic, and cultural forces to
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which he only occasionally refers” (par. 2). Such an accusation does not fall far from the mark,
but Donahue’s cynicism deemphasizes the usefulness of Lyotard’s contribution to the discourse
of postmodernity and the purpose of his approach. Contrasting Donahue’s analysis of The
Postmodern Condition, Wlad Godzich clarifies the reason for Lyotard’s approach in his
afterword to The Postmodern Explained, arguing that “[Lyotard] did not … seek an external
cause … for the disinclination felt toward the metanarratives of legitimation, but attempted
instead to locate it in these metanarratives themselves…” (114). Here, Huyssen reminds us that
poststructural counter-humanists are the archaeologists of modernity, and Lyotard performs the
same role in his theory on metanarratives: descriptive in posture and operating within
modernity’s assumptions and premises. Such a stance, though, does not discredit Lyotard, as
Donahue may want to suggest. Rather, reading Lyotard’s theory on metanarratives in
conjunction with Camus and Arendt adds not only to our understanding of the postmodern
perspective but also the role of totalitarianism in sparking the postmodern turn.
Buttressing Lyotard’s deconstruction of the metanarrative’s linguistic and
epistemological intricacies, Arendt and Camus examine the metanarrative’s political functions
and implications, actively questioning its legitimacy (delegitimating it) as an ethical standard for
judgment and action. Indeed, for Lyotard, delegitimation is inherent to the metanarrative itself,
an inevitable process arising out of the proliferation of science, but for the proto-postmoderns,
the metanarrative’s delegitimation is an act founded in an ethical criticism of political life, a
reaction to violence and the anti-humanist ideologies that degrade dignity. Where Lyotard says,
“[Postmodern] incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress
in turn presupposes it” (Condition xxiv), Arendt rebuts, “Progress … can no longer serve as the
standard by which to evaluate the disastrously rapid change-processes we have let loose [through
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science]” (Violence 30). In short, the proto-postmodern exploration of modern humanism’s
metanarratives exposes their liberatory claims as wholly absurd because they produce the
opposite of human emancipation: a systematized violence that actualizes immanent antihumanism. By immanent, I mean immediate, “in the world,” real in the sense that either a
lifeless corpse can be touched and witnessed or, from the standpoint of proto-postmodern
humanistic ethics, oppression of the mind and body that coerces enslavement by logic or
violence. At the center of this active delegitimation through fiction-making and theory are the
metanarratives of Marxism and capitalism, viewed by the proto-postmoderns as one in the same
because of their iron grip on Cold War political and ethical thinking and because of their mutual
reliance on the Idea of Progress, whose logic breeds immanent anti-humanism and eternally
defers dignity and emancipation to the future. Indeed, Progress itself as an idea embodies the
absurd humanistic anti-humanism of modernity that the proto-postmodernists resist.
As Lyotard conceives it, metanarratives are at the heart of modernity and are linked to
modern humanism. Rather than getting steeped in the contest over the technicalities engulfed in
defining the “metanarrative,” a simplified interpretation from Lyotard himself serves as a better
grounding for this discussion.16 In his “Apostil on Narratives,” Lyotard clarifies:
The “metanarratives” I was concerned with in The Postmodern Condition are
those that have marked modernity: the progressive emancipation of reason and
freedom, the progressive or catastrophic emancipation of labor, … the enrichment
of all humanity through the progress of capitalist technoscience, and even — if we
include Christianity itself in modernity — … the salvation of creatures through
the conversion of souls…. (17-18)
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Lyotard rebrands various modern humanisms in this passage under the name metanarratives:
Enlightenment, Marxist, and liberal humanisms, respectively, alongside a Christian humanism.
Indeed, speaking of Enlightenment humanism, Davies claims Thomas Paine’s “Age of Reason
forms a link between what Lyotard calls ‘the two major versions of the narrative of
legitimation’” in Postmodern Condition: the political narrative of humanity’s emancipation and
the philosophical narrative of speculative knowledge (27). According to Angélique du Toit in
The Lyotard Dictionary, these narratives legitimate because they “exer[t] a strong influence on
what is considered true and just … [because they] act as a measurement against which other
truths are to be judged” (86). As the sovereign truth and ethical standard, humanism gains its
weight in modern thinking, which explains in part the counter-humanism of postmodern
theorists, but on a closer inspection of The Postmodern Condition, these two types of narratives
do not produce a homogenous mode of thought for Lyotard. Instead, the political and
philosophical narratives diverge in how they express their humanist tenets along the lines of
history and emancipation.
As Davies’s comment on Paine implies, the two narratives of legitimation Lyotard
identifies—the philosophical (or speculative) and the political (or emancipatory)—are not
intrinsically linked, but oppose each other in their relationship to human subjectivity. Davies
notes this opposition when he argues, in connection to his reading of The Age of Reason, “[t]he
two themes converge and compete in complex ways … and between them set the boundaries of
its various humanisms” (27), which Lyotard’s epistemo-linguistic analysis details further. In
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard describes the political narrative as holding “humanity” as its
subject,17 while the philosophical narrative uses “the speculative spirit … embodied … in a
System” instead (31, 33). While he formulates these narratives in terms of their relationship to
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scientific knowledge, it is more important to focus on the theoretical implications of how each
narrative situates science in its paradigm. The political narrative takes science as its object; it
serves the narrative’s subject, humanity or the people, in its ability to self-govern. However, for
the philosophical narrative, both science and humanity act as objects; the subject, an “idea of a
System” or a “universal ‘history,’” sees these objects as “its own self-presentation and
formulation in the ordered knowledge of all of its forms contained in the empirical sciences”
(34). In humanist terms, the first centers on the human subject, taking the emancipation of
humanity as its legitimating principle, but the second holds the process and movement of history
as its center, where human emancipation acts as an affirmation of this movement. Its principle is
Reason by virtue of its immanence in the human history it constructs, or, as Lyotard says in his
“Missive,” “All that is real is rational, all that is rational is real” (29).18 Although Lyotard
separates the speculative narrative, or Hegelian Idealism, from the emancipatory narrative, or
Humanism “proper,” Hegelian philosophy remains invested in the value of human emancipation,
but focuses on philosophical, rather than political, means.19
When discussing the political contours of metanarratives, however, Lyotard abandons the
speculative narrative of legitimation. Consequently, he signifies metanarrative solely with “the
[political] narratives of emancipation” in his “Memoranda on Legitimation” (41), an essay on the
relationship between mythic narratives, metanarratives, and totalitarianism, despite the term
being associated only with the philosophical narrative in the body of The Postmodern Condition
(34). The ultimate irony in this reversal is the antagonism Lyotard expresses toward the
emancipatory narrative when he defines the metanarrative in Postmodern Condition: “But what
[German idealism] produces is a metanarrative, for the story’s narrator must not be a people
mired in the particular positivity of its traditional knowledge … [but] a metasubject in the
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process of formulating both the legitimacy of the discourses of empirical sciences and that of the
direct institutions of popular cultures” (34). The definitional language here implies that the
political and philosophical narratives are distinct according to the narrator’s identity, and Lyotard
privileges the latter when defining the metanarrative. While a collective notion of humanity tells
the tale of its own emancipation in the former narrative, a transcendent, abstract subject speaks
of “the becoming of spirit … in a rational narration” of history in the latter (33). Despite the
application of the philosophical label to the speculative narrative, it still legitimates political
institutions, implicating it in political modernity as Davies points out regarding Paine’s political
thought. For Arendt, however, the symbiosis of political and abstract narrators embodies the
missing link between totalitarianism and modern humanism’s metanarratives because of the
nature of political ideology.
While Lyotard argues that “[t]otalitarianism … subject[s] institutions legitimated by the
Idea of [emancipation] to legitimation by myth” (“Memoranda” 56), Arendt conceives of
totalitarianism as subjecting political thought to legitimation by the abstractions of the
speculative narrative. Her argument in “On the Nature of Totalitarianism” illustrates the
domineering role of abstraction over politics in the totalitarian model rather clearly.
Distinguishing the totalitarian dictator from the tyrant in order to extinguish claims that Nazism
and Stalinism are merely tyrannies, she describes how “[t]he totalitarian dictator … does not
believe that he is a free agent with the power to execute his arbitrary will, but, instead, the
executioner of laws higher than himself” (346). The abstract, transcendent “laws of Nature or
History” legitimate the actions of the totalitarian figurehead, and as Arendt interprets this type of
legitimation, it inverts the end of human emancipation driving most metanarratives, a product of
the Hegelian conception of history: “The Hegelian definition of Freedom as insight into and
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conforming to ‘necessity’ has here found a new and terrifying realization” (346). Such
legitimation through abstraction leads to inverting emancipation to signify freedom not for a
collective idea of humanity but for a universal law that unifies reality and subjects humanity to
itself.
However, Lyotard acerbically contests linking Hegel and speculative discourse to
totalitarianism. Responding to an attack by Gérard Raulet in “Postscript to Terror and the
Sublime,” Lyotard reasserts the mythic quality of totalitarian legitimation: “[The totalitarian]
appeal is to an inverse legitimacy, [not to achieving an idea in reality but] to the authority of
roots and of a race placed at the origin of the Western epoch…” (68). Of course, he separates
speculative discourse from totalitarianism rather than the speculative narrative, which may seem
like an inconsequential nuance, but Arendt’s definition of ideologies, which “determine the
political actions of the [totalitarian] ruler and make these actions tolerable to the ruled
population,” clarifies the narrative’s role in providing legitimacy: “[I]deologies are systems of
explanation of life and world that claim to explain everything, past and future, without further
concurrence with actual experience” (“Nature” 349-350, emphasis added). In the case of
ideology, the originary myth encompasses only one part of the narrative because ideology
envisions a history from its origin to its end and appeals to an progressive explanation of history
rather than a “founding” instance. Ideology and its speculative narrative links together all events
in time according to a totalized principle, or law, that predetermines not only the narrative chain
but also the actions needed to achieve its end. However, as Arendt observes, this principle does
not necessarily adhere to reality, and Ellison’s Invisible Man represents the disconnects and
discontinuities between ideological thinking and the spontaneous human reality outside its
abstractions and the hold ideology has on those who believe in the speculative narrative.
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While not representing totalitarianism in Invisible Man, the interaction of Ellison’s
narrator with the Brotherhood complements Arendt’s thought by representing the mindsets of
those faithful to its ideology. After seeing Tod Clifton, a former Brotherhood member, selling
and performing with Sambo dolls on a street corner, the narrator reflects on this act “as though
[Clifton] had chosen … to fall outside of history” (434). The fact that the narrator conceives of
an inside/outside binary to history speaks to the ideological nature of his thinking; it replicates
legal discourse, where “out-law” signifies being outside of the law, and people can fall inside or
outside of a legal or social code. Beyond conflating history with legality, the narrator equates this
inside position with meaningful, dignified existence and human emancipation as well, believing
“[Clifton] knew that only in the Brotherhood … could [they] avoid being empty Sambo dolls,”
yet Clifton’s “contemptuous smile” when he recognizes the narrator while manipulating the
puppet implies both acknowledgement and an identificatory subversion of the narrator’s belief
(433-434). Johnnie Wilcox speaks to the double meaning of “Sambo” during Invisible Man’s
battle royale scene in “Black Power: Minstrelsy and Electricity.” He says, “When the ‘blonde
man affirms with a wink’ what the M.C. says and calls the narrator ‘Sambo’ … [t]he wink
announces … ‘Sambo’ is not just a demeaning epithet but also a contextually accurate naming of
the narrator” (997-998). Clifton takes the place of the blonde man from earlier in the novel,
another cyclical recurrence in the novel, and his smile announces that the narrator’s place
“inside” history means he embodies the empty Sambo doll, while being outside history puts him
in charge of the Sambo image. For Clifton, plunging out of history and ideological thinking
means empowerment, a thought foreign to the narrator because he remains in the grasp of the
Brotherhood’s Marxist ideology.
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Indeed, Clifton’s “plunge” takes a greater and contrary significance for the narrator once
he witnesses Clifton’s death at the hands of the police, foreshadowing his eventual defiance of
the Brotherhood doctrinaires. The narrator’s initial anger at Clifton turns into questioning as he
churns the meaning of being “outside history” while wandering in the Harlem community. A
group of African-American boys sparks this shift, and he asks himself whether “history was a
gambler, instead of a force in a laboratory experiment … not a reasonable citizen, but a madman
full of paranoid guile and these boys his agents, his big surprise!” (441). His ruminations pull on
the threads of the ideological concept of history his Brotherhood training professes. History is
scientific and rational, a driving logic. By juxtaposing this view with a history personified as
spontaneous and chaotic, he realizes the contingency of the reality around him: “They’d been
there all along, but somehow I’d missed them…. They were outside the groove of history, and it
was my job to get them in, all of them” (443). His ideological thinking, conceiving the world
only in terms of history, produces his blindness to his community—to their dignity—and renders
Clifton invisible once he falls outside the Brotherhood. Only after witnessing a moment of
violence does he reconcile what actually happens with what is professed to happen, and the
community’s visibility congeals if and only if they accept to be inside history and conform to its
logic. When the narrator expresses his experiences and the reason why he valorizes Clifton at his
funeral to the Brotherhood, he explains to them, “I’m describing a part of reality which I know;”
however, one of the Brothers counters, “And that is the most questionable statement of all”
(471). This rebuttal exposes how the Marxist Idea of history negates any reality outside of its
ideology. According to its logic, Clifton cannot be reconciled and is outside of history because
“the [Brotherhood’s] directives had changed on him” (478), but this view of reality effectively
says, “To be outside the Brotherhood is to be outside history.” Its logic and only its logic
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explains the world, yet as the narrator comes to realize, this ideological assumption cannot hold a
monopoly on life and politics because of the spontaneity of human existence. However, the
ideological thought of totalitarianism sees human plurality only as a barrier to actualizing its
logic in the world, which, Arendt argues, “foreshadows the connection between ideology and
terror” (“Nature” 350).
Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle provides the most illustrative metaphor for the connection
between ideology and terror because its technical description of the apocalyptic ice-nine
demonstrates the intersectionality between speculative logic and anti-humanism, symbolically
detailing both the socio-political and ideological elements that play into totalitarian terror. As Dr.
Breed—the lead scientist at the Research Laboratory of the General Forge and Foundry
Company—describes it, ice-nine relies on “‘a seed’ … a tiny grain” in order to “[teach water]
atoms the novel way in which to stack and lock, to crystallize, to freeze,” and replicate its pattern
(45). Thus, the seed of ice-nine functions like the domineering ideology of totalitarianism
because it imposes a pattern, or logic, upon the atoms to which they are forced to adhere in order
to actualize ice-nine in reality. To draw the connection between ice-nine’s metaphorical
representation of terror further, Arendt deploys the phrase “atomized society” when recounting
the socio-political conditions necessary for terror to dominate society, and this condition enables
terror to have “the power to bind together completely isolated individuals” (“Nature” 356).
Taken as a social and political metaphor, ice-nine describes both the social condition of terror,
where individuals are “atoms,” and its result, the “binding together” and freezing of these
atomized individuals according to a “seed” that produces a totality.
While this metaphor for the terroristic paradigm under totalitarianism already represents
an anti-humanist social order, where ideology trumps the spontaneity social and individual
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human living, Vonnegut’s narrator presses Dr. Breed to reveal the global anti-humanist
consequences of ice-nine, a parallel of totalitarianism’s aspiration to totality. Starting with a
back-and-forth that explains how an entire swamp would freeze over by putting a seed of icenine in a puddle, the narrator pushes him to extrapolate that eventually—after the swamp’s
streams freeze over as ice-nine—lakes, rivers, oceans, and rain would also become ice and, as he
exclaims in frustration, “that would be the end of the world!” (47-50). At the end of the novel,
ice-nine precipitates a totalized, frozen world where all forms of life are eradicated and
crystallized in ice as the scientist prophesied. Although this aspect of ice-nine does not perfectly
parallel totalitarianism, which needs a social body in order to rule, it provides an allegory for the
way totalitarian domination seeks to totalized the world and human society according to a single
logic, a single “seed,” as well as the “human” aspect of society itself—its spontaneity.
Again, Arendt’s thought is instrumental in understanding Vonnegut’s metaphor for
totalitarianism. She claims, “For the totalitarian experiment of changing the world according to
an ideology, total domination of the inhabitants of one country is not enough” because “[t]he
existence … of any non-totalitarian country is a direct threat to the consistency of the ideological
claim” (“Nature” 352). Because totalitarianism’s legitimacy relies on the complete consistency
of its logic, it thus demands globalized coherence, a totalization of the globe that reflects its
claims about reality, much like what ice-nine produces once unleashed on the world. It
restructures and solidifies life according to its pattern, remaking the world and humanity in its
image. However, whereas totalitarianism only aspires to totality, ice-nine automatically totalizes
the world by virtue of its scientific and technological character, and this contrast between
political and scientific totalization underscores the danger science poses to the continued
existence of human life as well as its political consequences. Both in totalitarianism and its
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symbolic representation in the totality of ice-nine, a single idea calcifies “human” variance and
subjects the world to its truth, but as the scientific and apocalyptic nature of ice-nine implies, the
logicality of modern science that produces violence proves to be even more insidious than the
overt militarism and terror of totalitarianism, which Camus analyzes in each of his philosophical
essays.
Although Camus’s analysis of totalitarianism and its logic comes in his 1951 political
treatise The Rebel, the problem of adhering to pure logical thinking also informs his earlier
philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus, published in 1942 under Nazi occupation. While The
Rebel continues the project of delegitimating Marxism’s grip on political thought in France by
reimagining the disastrous potential of modern humanism’s mode of legitimation through a
totalized narrative, Myth hints at the ethical core of Camus’s thinking that resounds with his
claims in The Rebel because, as Ronald Srigley explains in Albert Camus’ Critique of Modernity,
“the famous ‘starting point’ arguments’” of both works express a desire for “a way beyond
modernity’s conclusions while remaining faithful to its premises” (8). In “Rethinking the
Absurd,” David Carroll remarks how a single “‘exigency’ informs Camus’s writings long after
he abandoned the concept of the Absurd itself” and the propositions he laid out in Myth in the
postwar years (54). Although he correctly characterizes Camus’s answer to this exigency as a
“‘will to resist,’ even or especially when resistance appears hopeless” (54), Carroll glosses over
what Camus identifies as the demand of his time—violence done onto the self and the other—
which is a much more significant thread between Myth and Rebel when considering Camus’s
critique of modernity.
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The opening pages of Myth lay out Camus’s intended method of exploration and the
essential problematic of suicide he wishes to cover. Beneath his focus on the question of suicide,
he reformulates the boundaries of his inquiry in terms of logicality:
Shades of meaning, contradictions, the psychology that an ‘objective’ mind can
always introduce into all problems have no place in this pursuit and this passion.
It calls simply for an unjust—in other words, logical—thought…. Reflection on
suicide gives me an opportunity to raise the only problem to interest me: is there a
logic to the point of death? (7).
Taking an anti-rationalist (and postmodern) stance when explicating his method, one which
“acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible” (9), Camus names purely
rational thought as one of the central problematics enveloped in the question of suicide. Framing
death in these terms, he places logicality at the center of his critique of modern philosophy and
modern politics because, for Camus, the pairing of logic and violence are ever-present forces
during both Nazi occupation and the Cold War era. “Does logic lead to violence?” Camus
continues to ask from Myth to The Rebel, which extends his protest to modern rationality into the
realm of political and historical thinking.
While Myth looks into epistemological and personally existential forms of violence,
affirming totalizing logic’s role in “philosophical suicide,” The Rebel centers on the question of
murder, which he calls “logical crime” (3), and terror, a systematic violence whose speculative
logic needs the ethical values of modern humanism in order to be legitimate.20 Concluding his
thoughts on Stalinism, Camus writes:
Those who launch themselves into [history] preaching its absolute rationality
encounter servitude and terror and emerge into the universe of the concentration
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camps…. The rational revolution … wants to realize the total man described by
Marx. The logic of history, from the moment that it is totally accepted, gradually
leads it, against its most passionate convictions, to mutilate man more and more
and to transform itself into objective crime…. [Stalinism represents] the
exaltation of the executioner by the victims…. [It] aims at liberating all men by
provisionally enslaving them all. (246-247)
While it seems ridiculous that the abused would place the abusers on a pedestal, Camus implies
in this concluding flourish how this absurd position results from the subjection of the humanist
value of emancipation to speculative logic—subjecting the ethic of dignity to the speculative
narrative of History that is imbued with rationality. Because History extols human freedom and
dignity as its end and is viewed as the only guarantee for these values, those who believe in its
movement claim erroneously that “it is already, in itself, a standard of values” (247). Only by
virtue of the political narrative of legitimation can doctrinaires bestow it with ethical value, yet it
maintains legitimacy only if History remains consistent and moves along to its predetermined
end. Thus, everyone in the political community must assert the objectivity and consistency of
historical logic, or, in other words, the inevitability of emancipation’s eventual realization via
History. The marriage of this modern humanist end of emancipation with faith in History’s
abstract inevitability, for Camus, leads directly to violence and terror.
Thus, when it promises emancipation through a deterministic law of history, modern
political humanism becomes an anti-humanism that kills and enslaves, inverting its own ethical
values. Camus expresses this transition when he says, “The land of humanism has become … the
land of inhumanity” (248). Matthew Sharpe’s reading of The Rebel in “Rebellion and the
Primacy of Ethics” explains that Camus argues against the supposed humanism of Marxism
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because its “founding principle or value … is a future community—a ‘we shall be’—whose
pursuit renders secondary the people (or ‘we’) who happen to exist today…” (84), and as Camus
announces, the realization of this future human community through historical inevitability will
never come to pass because “[t]he idea of a mission of the proletariat has not … been able to
formulate itself in history” (215). The “historical objectivity” of Marxism “has no definable
meaning, but power [and terror] will give it a content by decreeing that everything of which it
does not approve is guilty” (243). The idea of history, which guarantees the modern humanist
end of emancipation and dignity, must rely on terror and anti-humanist means in order to remain
objective and consistent because actual history has disproved its foundation premise. Because
those bound in Marxist ideology continue to proclaim the inevitability of dignity at the end of
History, it legitimates every death that has been framed as necessary to reach this end. Those
faithful to history’s ability to realize freedom take the rebel Prometheus, who actively works
toward humanist ends in the present, and nails him to a rock because his actions do not fit the
historical paradigm. In an absurd twist, the modern humanism of Marx inevitably creates the
violence of anti-humanism.
Camus’s fervor when attacking Marxism, though, hides his anti-capitalist stance, an often
overlooked aspect of Camus’s contribution to critical theory because of the stereotypes
consequent of the Sartre/Camus binary. As Camus sees it, a major portion of Marxism’s
ideological anti-humanism results from the modern bourgeois soil from which it grew, indicting
capitalism’s claim to human enrichment through industrial production in the anti-humanist turn
Marxist historical logic makes. Indeed, prior to his polemic against the legitimated violence of
Marxism’s vision of history, he frames the Marxist metanarrative as an offspring of capitalism
and enlightenment:
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Marx’s scientific Messianism is itself of bourgeois origin. Progress, the future of
science, the cult of technology and of production, are bourgeois myths, which in
the nineteenth century became dogma…. [According to Marx,] [t]he inevitable
result of private capitalism is a kind of State capitalism which will then only have
to put to the service of the community to give birth to a society where capital and
labor, henceforth indistinguishable, will produce, in one identical advance toward
progress, both justice and abundance…. [This inevitable progress of production
means] [t]he proletariat “can and must accept the bourgeois revolution as a
condition of the working-class revolution.” (193, 204)
As much as Camus condemns Marxism, he does so because it intensifies the capitalist faith in
production and the scientific faith in progress. It not only tolerates but praises the perpetuation of
modernity’s economic injustices and the degradation of human dignity. If we recall how Lyotard
defines the capitalist metanarrative, he says its end envisions “the enrichment of all humanity
through [its] progress,” so when Camus juxtaposes Marxism and capitalism, he illustrates how
Marxism merely poses an addendum to capitalist humanism, which complicates the
revolutionary aspect of its metanarrative. Marxist History maintains that the progress of capitalist
production will realize “the enrichment of all humanity,” but then stipulates this production will
eventually transform into a more humane and dignified form of labor.
For Camus, this commonality has wider reaching effects in Marxism, determining its own
idea of history because “[i]n that all human reality has its origins in the fruits of production,
historical evolution is revolutionary because the economy is revolutionary” (197). Marxism’s
speculative narrative, the transcendent logic to which all human reality conforms, thus derives
itself from capitalism as well because it follows in step with the modern, capitalist notion of
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economic and scientific progress. Camus reinforces this point when he says, “Nineteenth-century
Messianism [or faith in emancipatory progress], whether it is revolutionary or bourgeois, has not
resisted the successive developments of this science and this history, which to different degrees
they have deified” (197). While Stalinism produces terroristic anti-humanism because it
transposes its historical logic into political life, anti-humanism lies dormant in the metanarrative
of capitalist humanism as much as in the Marxist metanarrative because they both deify progress
as a guiding logic and principle in spite of the reality progress has created, which Vonnegut’s
ice-nine echoes. Camus accounts for the divide between the logic and reality of progress when he
says, “That is the mission of the proletariat: to bring forth supreme dignity from supreme
humiliation” (205), meaning works must subject themselves to the enslavement of production
before finding dignity at the end of history when the proletariat revolt will institute classless
society. While he states this anti-humanism in respect to Marxism, the same can be said of the
capitalist metanarrative—simply replace “the proletariat” with “economic progress”—which the
proto-postmodern novelists aim to illuminate. Through their fictions, they represent the antihumanist products of America’s humanist metanarratives in order to delegitimate the ideologies
of capitalism, scientism, and racism by exposing the absurdity of their humanist and ethical
claims.
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Combating American Anti-Humanism:
Absurdity, Rebellion, and Ethics in the Proto-Postmodern Novel
If, however, loss and violence may be deemed absurd, then we may imagine a
way out of the dilemma of excusing violence done to victims or legitimizing
revolutionary violence done to victimizers. It is possible to read … both
Camus’s and others’ absurd ethics, in this sense, as endeavors to make loss
and violence meaningless for the sake of delegitimizing loss and violence.
—Matthew H. Bowker, Rethinking the Politics of Absurdity
Although Bowker’s recent study on the connection between Camus’s Absurd and
political theory makes significant inroads toward re-reading Camus’s oeuvre, his central thesis,
which reads absurdity “as an endeavor … to make experience meaningless….[or] an effort to
obfuscate or mystify experience,” embarks on a logic that hamstrings the import of Camus’s
political and ethical insights (xv). While it serves his argument that absurdity is “the postmodern
passion par excellence,” it misinterprets The Rebel by having Camus assert that violence is
absurd (or “meaningless”).21 Rather, Camus accounts for violence differently: “In terms of the
encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe [which results in the Absurd],
murder and suicide are one and the same thing, and must be accepted or rejected together” (6).
Absurdist reasoning, as presented in Myth, famously rejects suicide by virtue of the Absurd and,
therefore, rejects murder on the same note: in order to maintain the Absurd, neither the inquirer
or the irrationality of the universe can be negated. For Camus, violence is not absurd or
meaningless but a consequence of rejecting the Absurd either through self-negation (suicide) or
the negation of others (murder), the physical manifestation of the refusal to accept that the world
is “indifferent.” Thus, Bowker’s thesis is an analytical misstep; it connects the Absurd to a
process of “making” or “fabricating” that Arendt and Camus identify as an aspect of violence.
Instead, the Absurd is “the gap” dividing “the certainty I have of my existence and the content I
try to give to that assurance,” the “divorce” between knowing I am human and the
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constructions—the meanings—I impose on the world to remind myself of this humanity (Myth
14-15). It is a feeling of morbid epiphany recognizing the meaninglessness of what we “know,”
prompted when “the stage sets collapse” rather than a process (10), and seeing it as a process
deprives absurdity’s theoretical import because it obscures absurdity’s potential function in
political thought and literature.
Deploying the Absurd as a literary tool, the proto-postmodern novelists exemplify how it
can be used as a tool for intervening in ethical and political systems that degrade dignity, and
critics have observed the role absurdity plays in each work. In the conclusion of “Invisibility,
Race, and Homoeroticism,” Michael Hardin sketches the overlaps between racial and sexual
invisibility in the context of the absurd choice of passing when “be[ing] freely visible and visibly
free” signifies “public liberation” for Ellison and other authors (116-117). Although “lying about
one’s identity [is] absurd” when liberation and personal dignity is the goal, he notes that
“visibility brings about its own dangers” as he recounts two hate-motivated lynchings as recently
as the 1990s (117). While Hardin connects Ellison’s use of absurdity with the anti-humanism
Arendt and Camus see operative in modern thinking, Robert Scholes’s argument in “Black
Humor and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.” sees the absurdity in Cat’s Cradle as a provocation to laughter:
“Progress, that favorite prey of satirists from Swift and Voltaire onward, means that some people
get free furniture and some get the plague … [b]ut the spuriousness of progress is not seen here
with the [fiery indignation] of the satirist” (par. 11). In his interpretation, Scholes recognizes
Vonnegut’s “affinit[y] with some existentialist attitudes” in his humor as well as his tongue-incheek prodding at modern progress, but viewing Cat’s Cradle and the other proto-postmodern
novels like Scholes does as solely “offer[ing] us laughter” instead of “scorn” and “resignation” in
their use of absurdity misses the political and ethical intervention at the center of these works
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(par. 11). However, Leon Seltzer’s take on the absurdity in Heller’s Catch-22 aims closer to its
disruptive potential. At the outset of “Absurdity as Moral Insanity,” he clarifies “how the novel’s
absurdities—comic and otherwise—operate almost always to expose the alarming inhumanities
which pollute our political, social, and economic system” (290). In this ethical sense, absurdity
as device for intervention unifies Invisible Man, Cat’s Cradle, and Catch-22. Through
representing the absurd “gap” or “divorce” between the espoused ethical values of American
ideologies (capitalism, scientism, and racism) and their immanent anti-humanism, these protopostmodern texts expose the absurdity of American humanism and of the idea of progress they
rely on for legitimacy.
Cat’s Cradle presents one of the lucid representations of modern humanism’s absurdity
in its representation of the gap between capitalism’s claim to human enrichment through science
and the intended purpose of ice-nine, the scientific product that precipitates the apocalypse at the
end of the novel. In doing so, Vonnegut delegitimates the idea of scientific progress by exposing
the banal insanity of “progress” as well as the immanent anti-humanism at the core of such
banality. During the narrator’s foray into the past life of the deceased father of the atomic bomb,
Felix Hoenikker, whom the narrator intends to write about in a nonfictional “account of what
important Americans had done on the day when the first atomic bomb was dropped on
Hiroshima” (1), Dr. Breed, a former colleague of Hoenikker, explains to the narrator what
prompted Hoenikker to create ice-nine. Breed recalls how “a Marine general … was hounding
[Felix] to do something about mud,” and as the general imagined it, “one of the aspects of
progress should be that Marines no longer had to fight in mud” (42-43). Out of this request,
Hoenikker develops ice-nine to fix the Marines’ “mud problem.” For the reader who knows that
ice-nine causes the world to end, eliminating mud is incomparable to the consequences of the
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solution, and the banality of the request in the name of “progress” calls into question not just the
legitimacy of the request but the idea of progress itself. This modern “value” rings hollow when
solving the mundane problem of mud trumps perpetual violence and war. Moreover, because
progress leads to the creation of a scientific product dooming the world to annihilation, the
underlying legitimation humanism bestows on the progress of science as an agent of
emancipation becomes absurd: ice-nine would liberate the Marines from “two-hundred years of
wallowing in mud,” yet realizing this liberation perpetuates war and destroys life in its totality.
Just as Camus argues about Marxism, Vonnegut highlights how the deification of progress,
scientific in this case instead of political or economic, opens the moral space for the violent and
destructive means of ice-nine to be developed and deployed.
In the same vein, Heller’s representation of Milo Minderbinder, the mess hall officer who
establishes a capitalist conglomerate in Catch-22, exposes the absurdity of capitalism’s faith in
unbridled profit as a vehicle of progress, emancipation, and dignity. Seltzer takes this absurdity
and the absurd character of Milo as the central theme in Catch-22. While he views the novel’s
absurdity arising from Milo’s supposed innocence when his actions are framed solely in terms of
a loyalty to the “morally insane” logic of capitalism, Seltzer’s interpretation of this “innocence”
routinely speaks to capitalist humanism’s absurdity. Reading the scene where Minderbinder
“arranges and mercilessly executes the tremendously profitable deal with the Germans to bomb
and strafe his own base,” Seltzer argues that “[Milo] is able to commit this cold-blooded atrocity
with a clear conscience” because “his morally insane business ethic [makes human impediments]
disappear altogether” (294). Likewise, he interprets Milo’s imposition of chocolate-covered
cotton on the squadron as a foodstuff as evidence that “Milo’s ruthlessly capitalistic
commitments do not, and cannot, support life” (295). Despite Seltzer painting “[his] treachery”
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as being “innocently motivated by … [a] mistaken faith” (299), his numerous examples of
Milo’s transgressions against humanity expose how capitalist logic promotes and abets such
violence. Seltzer underscores the absurdity of capitalist humanism when he claims that “[Milo]
idealistically envisions [his syndicate] as affirming humanity (since ‘everyone has a share’) at
the same time that his bedazzled commitment to [profit] leads him systematically to trample on
the rights of others” (302). While Seltzer’s article highlights how Milo embodies an “absurd
innocence” (302), it also reveals the absurdity of capitalism’s humanistic logic without naming it
directly. Indeed, for Milo’s violent actions to be deemed absurdly innocent when viewed through
his commitment to capitalist logic, capitalism itself has to be absurd and anti-humanist for Milo
to have the moral space to act “faithfully” within its ethical framework.
Ellison takes the absurd anti-humanism of capitalist humanism a step further than Heller
in Invisible Man by struggling with the absurdity of the relationship between American
capitalism and racism. In the narrator’s ruminations during the epilogue, he reflects on the dying
words of his grandfather and poses himself a series of questions as he tries to untangle its
meaning.22 Two of these questions, related to one another, ask:
Did he mean say “yes” because he knew that the principle was greater than the
men, greater than the numbers and the vicious power and all the methods used to
corrupt its name? Did he mean affirm the principle, which they themselves had
dreamed into being out of the chaos and darkness of the feudal past, and which
they had violated and compromised to the point of absurdity even in their own
corrupt minds? (574, emphasis added)
The principle he names, in the American context, evokes the humanism of the Declaration of
Independence and the social foundations of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
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However, these humanist values were paired with the capitalist institution of American slavery.23
Richard Hofstadter notes in The American Political Tradition that Southern antebellum
statesman John C. Calhoun argued for the slave’s relative dignity when compared to the
devastating effects of free labor relations on workers in Europe (103). Despite such a claim,
slavery’s inherent violence and human degradation, legitimated by economic and racial logic,
undoes the underlying humanism of economic liberalism because it simultaneously dehumanizes
African-Americans and excludes them from its emancipatory vision. Thus, Ellison reveals how
the capitalist logic of enriching humanity, even from its inception, is an absurd notion because
the institution of slavery functioned on an immanent anti-humanism and implies that such
thinking aids in perpetuating violence, and thought is the starting point for lapses in humanist
ethics.
Complementing Camus’s concept of absurdity as a tool for understanding the function of
each novel’s representation of American logics and their anti-humanism, Arendt’s concepts of
“representative thinking” and the Socratic “two-in-one” offer a framework for interpreting the
texts’ portrayal of self-contradictory thought, such as the case of Milo Minderbinder, as well as
how such portrayals pose a rebellious counterpoint to the Cold War paradigm. This rebellion,
like the novels’ use of absurdity, can also be understood in Camusian terms. As he describes it in
The Rebel, rebellion “says yes and no simultaneously” (13). The contradiction of rebellion’s
affirmation yet negation comes from its foundation “on the categorical rejection of an intrusion
[by authority] that is considered intolerable and on the confused conviction of an absolute right
which […] is more precisely the impression that [the rebel] ‘has the right to …’” (13). Springing
from “a feeling of revulsion at the infringement of his rights and a complete and spontaneous
loyalty to certain aspects of himself,” the rebel “[t]hus … implicitly brings into play a standard
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of values,” yet because “the individual is not … the embodiment of the values [the rebel] wishes
to defend [but] needs all humanity … to comprise them,” rebellion engages in the ethical
discourse of humanism as well (14, 17). Because the proto-postmodern novels target their
negations against the modes of thought and social hierarchies that create or lead to violence and
dehumanization rather than humanism itself, they thus rebel against humanist logics by saying
“no” to the violence anti-humanist ideologies produce while simultaneously affirming the
humanistic value of dignity that they see neglected by modern humanism. For Ellison, Heller,
and Vonnegut, the rebel (and humanity) has a right to dignity that is common to all life.
However, the absurdity of modern humanism and its ethics are not self-evident because
the novelists play with cultural logics that may also interpellate the reader into the ideologies
they represent. Thus, the literary characters who act from these ideologies only can be
understood as absurd or humanistically bankrupt by the reader if the novelist intervenes by
representing the relationship between thought and action, as in the case with their use of
representative and dialogic thought. In “Understanding in Politics,” Arendt explains that
“understanding [is] the other side of [political] action” (321). Because thought and action
continuously supplement and inform each other, the texts must go beyond representing modern
humanism’s absurdity and also rebel against the thinking that allows its characters to commit (or
be complicit in) violence while continuing to profess humanist ends. To do so, the novelists
represent a humanistic character in their narratives, whether a protagonist or narrator, to contrast
with the unthinking (or perverted thinking) of morally reprehensible characters in order to
expose modern humanism’s anti-humanist logic and ethics. They contrapose a humanist
character with an anti-humanist character, or humanism with anti-humanism, and this
juxtaposition defines each novel’s rebellion. Camus elucidates this interplay between art and
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rebellion as he concludes The Rebel, claiming that “art … give[s] us a final perspective on the
content of rebellion” because “[a]rtistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the
world … on account of what [the world] lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is” (253).
However, his analysis of the novel places emphasis on “the demand for unity” rebellion desires,
and he argues that its “aim” is “to create a closed universe or a perfect type” (259). In this
conception, the novel expresses metaphysical rebellion by creating a “perfect” universe in which
humanity overcomes its limits and achieves the condition it desires.24 The proto-postmodern
novel, on the other hand, creates a anti-humanist universe—the world that it negates—and
represents it as absurd while also creating an individual in this world who rebels and affirms
individual and collective dignity.
Invisible Man most potently expresses this form of rebellion in its symbolism of Brother
Tarp’s broken chain, and the narrator carries this symbol with him to the end of the narrative,
where he lucidly expresses his own rebellion. During a conversation between Brother Tarp and
the narrator, the elderly Brotherhood member tells the narrator the crime that led to his time on a
chain gang. He explains, “I said no to a man who wanted to take something from me; that’s what
it cost me for saying no, and even now the debt ain’t fully paid and will never be paid in their
terms” (387). While the nature of his crime remains ambiguous, Tarp’s dialogue suggests he was
jailed for rebelling against the demands of a debt collector or financier, and even after his
imprisonment, he “kept saying no until [he] broke the chain and left” (387). This act, though,
goes beyond simply saying “no.” As Tarp gives the broken chain link to the narrator, he explains
“it’s got a heap of signifying wrapped up in it … think[ing] of it in terms of but two words, yes
and no, but it signifies a heap more” (388). Tarp’s language evokes the exact wording of
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Camus’s definition of rebellion and thus defines his act of saying no to imprisonment as an
affirmation of his own humanity.
Because the narrator carries this symbol of rebellion with him through the rest of the
narrative, Ellison draws the connection between Tarp’s act and the narrator’s story. To
emphasize this connection, of all the symbols he carries of his past life—his high school diploma
that taught him humiliation is progress, the racist symbol of the Sambo doll, and an anonymous
threatening letter revealed to be written by the Brotherhood leader who named him—Tarp’s
chain link is the only symbol that remains at the end of the narrative because the narrator burns
the rest for light in the sewers after he escapes the Harlem riots (567-568). Through this contrast,
Ellison suggests the permanency and substance of rebellion and the hollowness of the narrator’s
lives while following the capitalist and Marxist metanarratives. The act of burning them implies
that the narrator figuratively says “no” to their paper-thin content and signals that he chooses
visibility and solidity over darkness, and he proclaims his rebellion in the epilogue: “[A]fter
years of trying to adopt the opinions of others I finally rebelled. I am an invisible man” (573). In
rejecting those who named him, he declares his resounding “no” to their narratives and his place
in them. Although “invisible” signifies an erasure of his humanity, his naming himself as such
affirms his rebellion against his lack of representation in others’ minds, those who have dictated
his existence in the past, which provides a language for him and others to represent his condition.
As Ellison conceives the term, “invisibility” directly invokes Arendt’s concept of
“representative thinking.” In “Truth and Politics,” Arendt claims that “[p]olitical thought is
representative,” meaning that people “form an opinion by considering a given issue from
different viewpoints, by making present to [their] mind[s] the standpoints of those who are
absent; that is, [they] represent [others]” (556). In the prologue, the invisible man’s explication
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of invisibility as a consequence of his existence being erased in the minds of others reflects the
incapacity of representative thought. As he describes it, “[T]hey approach me [and] they see only
my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything
except me” (1). This passage indicates how his lack of representation in others’ minds produces
his invisibility, how the narrator does not appear to those who “see” him. When the narrator says
this inability to represent “occurs because of a peculiar disposition … of their inner eyes, those
eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality” (1), he implicates their
inability to think and judge in this condition as well, which Arendt calls a “blind obstinacy”
(“Truth” 556). Because others subject him to erasure in their minds, they prompt him to question
his human existence, forcing him to “wonder whether [he isn’t] simply a phantom in other
people’s minds” (2). However, his phantasmal, invisible existence, besides having personally
existential ramifications, takes an essentially political character when he ruminates on what
creates such cognitive blindness, connecting racism and racially motivated violence with the
limited space whites allow African-Americans in the humanist vision of American politics.
Because others are unable to “see” and represent him in their minds, they deprive him of
his humanity and consequently exclude him from the American ideals of emancipation by fixing
him into an inhumane, undignified place in its “humanist” narrative. Although the novel negates
this condition, it rebels against anti-humanism by providing it a language and a concept, which
then allows readers to represent the anti-humanism embedded in American humanism in their
own minds. Although Shelly Jarenski focuses on the empowering potential of invisibility in
“Invisibility Embraced,” her reading of the novel’s “battle royale” scene, where powerful white
community members subject the invisible man to a bloody boxing match for entertainment,
alludes to visibility’s political ramifications. She argues, “Whites can only ‘see’ the narrator
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when he performs the roles expected of black men, as in this case when he can only give his
speech after he has been dehumanized by the battle. Similarly, he can only visualize himself
within the context of a black role that has already been officially recognized, specifically that of
Booker T. Washington” (90). The narrator’s visibility thus depends on the anti-humanism of
racist ideas, ones which subject the black body to violence, as well as a constrained idea of
humanism, one which, as the narrator summarizes the speech he delivered at his graduation, sees
“humility [as] the secret, indeed, the very essence of progress” (17). Here, Camus’s explanation
of the proletariat’s supposed mission resonates with Ellison’s critique of racism: through the
Washingtonian narrative of uplift, the African-American community must bring “supreme
dignity from supreme humiliation.”
Only through humility or humiliation, or, in other words, by foregoing his dignity, can
the invisible man find representation in white minds, which is antithetical to the proclaimed
ethics of American humanism and the ideal of equality. The narrator elucidates this absurd antihumanist humanism at the foundation of American political thought when he says in the
epilogue, “You won’t believe in my invisibility and you’ll fail to see how any principle that
applies to you could apply to me” (580). In other words, white minds conceive humanist
progress in a way that erases the humanity of African-American being by demarcating restraints
on what constitutes the “human,” excluding any representation of race other than white or
subordinated, humiliated black-ness in the capitalist idea of human enrichment. His human-ness
and dignity are never represented because visibility always depends either on whitewashing or
inequality, but by having the narrator name “invisibility” and unravel what creates it, the novel
gives readers a way to see how humanism applies to the invisible man. Its representations
provide visibility to invisibility itself and provide readers the tools to think representatively when
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they make judgments, reminding them of the invisibility, the erasure of African-American
dignity, that the American narrative of economic progress and political equality historically
entails.
While Invisible Man rebels against the racial anti-humanism at the heart of American
humanism, which gives readers language to think more humanistically and expand their capacity
for representative thought, Cat’s Cradle uses representative thinking to expose how science’s
“blind obstinacy” leads it to become complicit in violence. As Vonnegut creates the mindset of
Felix Hoenikker, the scientist lacks the capacity for representative thought, which leads to a lapse
in moral judgment that allows him to create ice-nine and indirectly cause the apocalypse. As
Arendt claims, representative thought relies on a person “to remain in this world of universal
interdependence, where [one] can make [herself] the representative of everybody else” (556).
Hoenikker, though, divorces himself from this mutual world: one of the narrator’s interlocutors
in Cat’s Cradle remarks that he had “never met a man who was less interested in the living” than
Hoenikker (68). This disinterest renders him unable to represent anyone else in his thought
because he makes minimal effort to relate with the human world. His negligence to account for
the human world and the violent consequences of science leads to his failure to judge the
consequences of his actions and his research. While Arendt views this lack of representative
thought as only invalidating the impartiality of a person’s opinions or judgments, Daniel Zins’s
reading of Cat’s Cradle in “Rescuing Science from Technocracy” pushes her concept of
representative thinking to connect Hoenikker’s blindness to the inhumanity in which he
participates. Before noting that “Felix … has allowed his own brain to be stretched only in the
most narrow, technocratic manner,” Zins concludes that Hoenikker’s thoughtless character
challenges our “prefer[ence] to blame our nuclear predicament on an unbridled technology” and
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“suggests that it is our failure to be fully human that especially endangers us” (172, 171).
Through Hoenikker’s blinding enamorment with science, Vonnegut thus vilifies absolute belief
in scientific progress because it makes people such as Hoenikker narrow-sighted, corroding the
sense of moral responsibility that defines our individual humanity and maintains the dignity of
others.
What allows the persistence of such narrow-sightedness to represent others? In other
words, what thought process leads a person to participate in logics that perpetuate anti-humanism
while believing it emancipates and preserves dignity? Seltzer’s account of Milo Minderbinder
accounts for one answer to this question when he names Milo as “innocent,” though “morally
insane.” This insanity, Seltzer argues, is “a curiously innocent perversion of reason so total as to
blind the actor from any meaningful recognition of the moral components of his (or anybody
else’s) behavior” (292). Felix Hoenikker represents this same type of insanity: after the
detonation of the atomic bomb, his remark to the idea that “[s]cience has now known sin” is,
tellingly, “What is sin?” (Vonnegut 17). However, characterizing Milo’s or Hoenikker’s thought
in this way leaves unanswered how they are able to follow the corrupted logic of capitalist
techno-science and simultaneously maintain their innocence when the evidence of their
complicity in violent acts should prompt a feeling of guilt. In these terms, another aspect of
Arendt’s theory on the nature of thinking provides a method to understand how this absurd
innocence is possible.
In a section of The Life of the Mind, Arendt posits the dialogic “two-in-one” as the
primary mode of thought, and she suggests that neglecting this dialogic relationship aids in
absolving an individual’s conscience because, by avoiding dialogue with oneself, he or she never
comes to take account of his or her actions. As Arendt conceives it, the “duality of myself with
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myself” characterizes the two-in-one, where “I am both the one who asks and the one who
answers,” and its dialogic nature means “[t]hinking can become … critical because it goes
through [a] questioning and answering process…” (408). This dialogic thought process engages
in a self-criticism and thus operates on the Socratic maxim, “It is better to suffer wrong than to
do wrong” (410). Acting morally thus “keeps the integrity of this partner intact” and ensures one
does not “lose the capacity for thought altogether” (“Truth” 559). As Arendt conceives it,
individuals have a choice when they allow “a basic contradiction” to divide these interlocutors,
such as committing murder: either take account of the action and reconcile oneself with the guilt
or “never start the soundless solitary dialogue we call ‘thinking’” (“Two-in-One” 412).
Vonnegut represents the latter choice when accounting for the agents who precipitate the
ice-nine apocalypse and their lack of thinking. The three children of Felix Hoenikker all embody
the “unthinking” mindset, and their forgetfulness blinds them to their guilt and complicity in
mass death and allows them to believe they act from a sound ethical framework. According to
Arendt, the unthinking individual who chooses not to enter dialogue with himself or herself “will
not mind contradicting himself … nor will he mind committing any crime, since he can count on
its being forgotten the next moment” (412). The nature of unthinking therefore absolves any and
all self-contradictions by nullifying unethical act itself, obliterating its existence in the person’s
mind because he or she never account for it in their internal dialogue.
Cat’s Cradle represents the centrality of unthinking’s role in abetting violence when the
Hoenikker children fail to recall the details of the night they divided up their father’s invention
among themselves. After the three children and the narrator clean up the ice-encrusted room of
“Papa” Monzano, whose suicide initiates the total freezing of the world under the metaphorical
terror of ice-nine, the narrator writes how their recollection of that night “petered out when they
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got to the details of the crime itself” (251). The narrator signals here how the simple act of
dividing up ice-nine itself was a crime, an anti-humanist act that should have precipitated a selfcontradiction in the Hoenikkers’ thinking because each of them armed warmongering nations
with the means of total destruction (244). However, all they could remember was “what ice-nine
was, recalling the old man’s brain-stretchers, [with] no talk of morals” (251). As David Ullrich
argues in “The Function of ‘Oubliette,’” they “commit symbolic ‘oubliation’” in this instance,
obliterating their memory “in order to … evade individual culpability and global responsibility”
(150). While Ullrich reads the Hoenikkers as agents who “willfully repress memories of past
events” (149), their ability to recall other details of the night yet inability to remember the
obvious moral ramifications of this act indicates otherwise. They never thought about what
dividing up ice-nine meant and never registered it as a crime. In doing so, they protect
themselves from grasping their complicity in the world’s end, and this unthinking forgetfulness
permits Frank Hoenikker, the one who is most directly complicit in the apocalypse, to
“dissociat[e] himself from the causes of the mess; identifying himself … with the purifiers, the
world-savers, the cleaners-up” (Cradle 242). Similar to his father and Milo Minderbinder, Frank
perceives himself as innocent and part of the moral bastion of human progress.
However, his innocence only makes sense in his own mind because his unthinking frees
him from realizing his own ethical misstep, and Vonnegut’s representation of the Hoenikker
children and their innocence is absurd because of the novel’s rebellion against their unthinking.
With the narrator’s intervention, who poses the questions that expose their complicity, they
cannot maintain their innocence in the eyes of readers. By naming and representing their act of
dispersing ice-nine as a “crime,” like the account of their father’s inability to represent the
violent and unethical consequences of science in his thought, the narrator acts as a humanistic
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conscience. He calls these supposedly innocent characters to account for their actions either
directly to them within the text or to readers. Through the narrator’s outrage at the Hoenikkers’
turn away from their consciences, Cat’s Cradle affirms its humanistic and ethical stance by
having the narrator resist and rebel against the world constructed around him. Moreover, the
novel presents the act of text-making as a sort of rebellion. The religious leader Bokonon, whose
religion frames the narrator’s concept of the world throughout the novel, closes the novel with
his last lines, which read, “If I were a younger man, I would write a history of human stupidity
… and I would make a statue of myself, lying on my back, grinning horribly, and thumbing my
nose at You Know Who” (287). The narrator, a Bokononist as he writes the novel presented to
us, heeds the words of Bokonon and writes his own “history of human stupidity,” and he directs
his rebellion, or “thumbing his nose,” at the anti-humanist thinking of Felix, the disingenuous
humanism and innocence of Frank, and the violence of ice-nine he saw in his world instead of
God. Through its representations both of the humane and inhumane elements of its world, the
rebellious text enables the reader’s own two-in-one by reflecting the dialogic nature of thought in
its dialogic universe. Using the two-in-one as a mode of intervention in combating antihumanism, it connects unthinking and absurdly innocent characters to the monologic thought
that modern humanism’s logic engenders, which Camus critiques in The Fall as central to
modern ethics.
Like Frank Hoenikker’s self-deceit, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the judge-penitent in
Camus’s novel The Fall, takes extensive measures to avoid his conscience, which he
aggressively acknowledges in his meandering monologue. Clamence reveals that at “the very
moment” he felt “a vast feeling of power and … completion … a laugh burst out,” and as he
describes it, this laughter had “come from nowhere unless from the water” (39). The connection
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between water and this laughter is crucial; one of two moments buried in Clamence’s
“monological confession,” as David Ellison names it in “Withheld Identity,” provide the
necessary context to understand this event as a phantasmal invasion of the conscience.25 The last
in the chronological sequence (rather than the twisting narrative sequence) shows Clamence
neglecting to prevent a woman who plunges off a bridge from committing suicide (69-70).26 His
conscience thus haunts him years afterward, manifesting itself in laughter emitting from the
water, and it reminds him of the life he could have saved and figuratively calls him “home,” as
Arendt would say, to rectify himself. However, prior to the laughter’s intervention, Clamence
travels the same path as the Hoenikkers and chooses to forget the incident and the selfcontradiction it causes, which he reveals in his response to the narrative’s interlocutor about the
suicide: “What? That woman? Oh, I don’t know…. The next day, and the days following, I
didn’t read the papers” (71). David Ellison draws a similar conclusion of this scene, noting how
“[i]mmediately after the telling of this central … event, Clamence … arrives at [his] Amsterdam
residence, which [he] describes … as an abri, or ‘refuge’” (180). Jean-Baptiste thus maintains
his innocence by putting his complicity out of mind through monologuing and making the event
utterly banal. Instead of thinking, he takes symbolic refuge in the ignorance of his (in)action that
led to a woman’s death.
However, Clamence’s conscience continuously confronts him, and he chooses to look for
other means of silencing it instead of reconciling his two-in-one and accepting his guilt. As
Ellison claims, he turns to “verbose assertions of a generalised human guilt” as “a strategy of
avoidance … [and] an attempt to hide from his own guilt” (181). Clamence speaks of this
strategy when he uncovers the aim of his confession at the end of the narrative: “Now my words
have a purpose. They have the purpose, obviously, of silencing the laughter, of avoiding
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judgment personally, though there is apparently no escape” (131). This passage attains a
particular significance if we read it in conjunction with Amit Marcus’s analysis of Clamence’s
futile attempts to silence his conscience in “The Dynamics of Narrative Unreliability.” After
detailing Clamence’s period of self-indulgence as an attempt to escape, Marcus says, “[T]he
attempt of the narrator to forget the laughter succeeded merely for a short period…. [H]e realizes
that the outcry of that woman and the laughter that ensued would never leave him, that he would
never be able to immerse himself in self-forgetfulness” (par. 14). The incessant reminders of his
crime of human neglect means his mind will always compel him to enter dialogue with himself,
so he has to take recourse in other means in order to avoid self-judgment and put himself in
agreement with his conscience, “[t]he only criterion of Socratic thinking” according to Arendt
(“Two-in-One” 408).
Because he refuses to think and engage with his conscience, Clamence must have others
present to listen silently to and reproduce his confession in order to reconcile his guilt, and his
method eradicates the dialogic nature of the two-in-one and of communicative speech by binding
it into a monologue. In this relationship, where he continuously professes his guilt to strangers,
he symbolically embodies his conscience and gives it a voice, ironically silencing his thought by
externalizing the two-in-one and projecting it into a monologic form: he paints a “portrait” of
himself that “becomes a mirror” to his listener (140). In constructing this portrait, Clamence
produces a representation of his conscience, which he reflects onto his listener. He thereby
renders the capacity for representative thought useless because the listener cannot represent him
or herself or any other person in their mind; only Clamence is heard and represented. Thus, his
monological confession constricts the listener’s mind into reproducing his guilt, and in binding
his listeners to regurgitate his confession, Clamence dissolves the dialogic nature of conversation
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and thought alike into a monologue where only his voice and his representation of the world
exists, which, for Camus, leads to terror.27
Because Clamence’s form of discourse constrains the listener’s representative thought
into a monologic form, he also distorts his listener’s ability to judge his actions according to
humanist standards, which provides him final absolution. Returning to Arendt’s theory on
thinking in “Two-in-One,” she argues thinking “does not create values … [and] does not confirm
but, rather, dissolves accepted rules of conduct,” and she names this aspect of thought its
“purging component” (413-414). Because this purge “brings out the implications of unexamined
opinions and thereby destroys them,” it has a “liberating effect on … the faculty of judgment,”
which handles “particulars without subsuming them under general rules which can be taught and
learned,” by enabling a person “to say ‘this is wrong’”(414). If the two-in-one relies on being in
agreement with oneself, then thought must also interrogate common-sensical “values, doctrines,
[and] theories” to see if they will lead to a contradiction in the particular self (413-414). Out of
this interrogation, a person is then able to judge whether a universalized or socially accepted
value will be a just standard for action or speech in a particular situation. The connection Arendt
draws between thinking and judging helps explains why Clamence’s method targets his listener’s
capacity for representative thought. Through the process of pontification and repetition, by
mirroring himself onto the listener, he silences the listener’s thoughtful interrogation of guilt’s
universality, which coerces his listener to judge every particular—especially Clamence
himself—according to an anti-humanist “doctrine” of universal guilt. Forced to take Clamence’s
assertion that humanity is, was, and always will be guilty as universally true, the listener then
judges Clamence’s choice to neglect saving a life as acceptable. In his logic of guilt, he is
absurdly innocent even if he is “an enlightened advocate of slavery” and fundamentally opposed
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to the ideals of emancipation and dignity. His absurd way of thinking legitimates any and all
violence he may commit because everyone is already declared guilty and deserves punishment
(Fall 132).
Using Seltzer’s language of “absurd innocence” to describe Clamence clarifies an
important point about logicality in both Catch-22 and The Fall: Jean-Baptiste Clamence’s
monologue expresses a Catch-22 when applied to judgments about guilt and innocence. In
“Negation as a Stylistic Feature in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22,” Laura Hidalgo Downing concisely
breaks down the propositional structure of the novel’s (il)logical “catch” as follows: “If you are
crazy you can be grounded / If you want to be grounded you have to apply / If you apply you are
not crazy” (4.3.14).28 Clamence’s monologue constructs a similar logical pattern that assumes
guilt is universal: “If you judge Clamence for his actions, he is guilty / If he is guilty, you are
also guilty / If you are also guilty, you cannot judge Clamence for his actions.”29 As Downing
clarifies, Catch-22 “is a kind of trap that prevents the proposition You can be grounded from
ever being applicable” (4.3.14). Likewise, Clamence’s logic forbids his listener from ever
passing judgment on him. The listener cannot say “he is guilty.” His logic affords him a logical
escape hatch to “permit [him]self everything again, and without the laughter [the judgment] this
time” (Fall 141-142). While Catch-22’s namesake most clearly binds its characters into flying
combat missions and continuing war endlessly, Milo Minderbinder expresses a logical trap (or
trapdoor) similar to Jean-Baptiste Clamence. As Seltzer claims, the name “‘Minderbinder’ may
possibly have been contrived to suggest Milo’s amazing ‘binding of minds’ through his steady
deluge of self-serving capitalist rhetoric” that is supported by its own Catch-22 (299).
Like Jean-Baptiste Clamence, Milo relies on capitalism’s humanist claims to permit
himself to act in whatever way he wishes by binding Yossarian’s capacity for judgment, which
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produces a Catch-22 that disrupts Yossarian’s thinking. An argument between Minderbinder and
Yossarian over Milo’s responsibility for a man who died in an absurd military engagement,
where Milo “realized a fantastic profit” from defending and attacking a bridge simultaneously,
foregrounds Minderbinder’s logical twist (261). Reacting to “Yossarian’s angry protest” that
“[he] organized the whole thing…. [and] got a thousand dollars extra for it,” which makes him
guilty for the man’s death, Milo invokes capitalism’s metanarrative to make Yossarian complicit
in his actions: “But I didn’t kill him. I wasn’t even there, I tell you…. And I didn’t get the
thousand dollars. That thousand dollars went to the syndicate, and everybody got a share, even
you” (262). Punctuating his rebuttal with “even you,” Minderbinder constructs an identical logic
to Clamence. Rather than universal guilt, however, he uses the capitalist assumption that
“everybody has a share of the syndicate’s profits.” If the syndicate profits, Yossarian profits;
therefore, he is as guilty as Milo for the man’s death and thus cannot pass judgment without
judging himself as well, and this logic expresses how capitalist anti-humanism gets an ethical
pass.
While this binding of Yossarian’s mental faculties conveys a localized instance of Milo’s
and capitalism’s Catch-22, the pages follow Minderbinder globalizing these bonds of guilt after
he conducts a bombing raid against his own squadron, which “looked like the end for [Milo]….
until he opened his books to the public and disclosed the tremendous profit he had made” (264,
266). Despite official condemnations and “clamor[s] for punishment” (266), Minderbinder
sidesteps guilt for his actions and legitimates the violence he commits on society en masse by
resorting to the same universal humanist assumption that deflected Yossarian’s judgment. Even
on the societal level, Milo deteriorates collective judgment, allegorically representing, according
to Gary Davis in “Catch-22 and the Language of Discontinuity,” “the close alliance between
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conceptions of language, society, and economics within the modern intellectual order” (72).
Although Davis bases this reading of Minderbinder on the discontinuous relationship “between
the [syndicate’s] shares and a ‘reality’ beyond,” a discontinuity readers can see only because of
Yossarian’s (and Heller’s) intervention, he adds that what “M & M Enterprises reminds us” is
how “violence and the characters’ often unusual attitudes toward violence are inseparable from
the question of discontinuity” (72). When considering “Milo & Minderbinder” and the capitalist
order he represents, the discontinuity in the responses to violence and acts of violence revolves
around guilt and innocence. These categories have become meaningless in capitalist humanism’s
system of logic and its imposed assumption of universal enrichment. Because of the logic’s
circular structure, Yossarian and society as a whole must remain silent and refrain from judging
Milo’s actions as wrong and anti-humanistic in order to maintain their innocence. Milo’s
deflection of judgment and dissent, however, represents only only one connection between the
Catch-22’s linguistic structure and the novel’s dysfunctional bureaucratic language.
In order to distort concepts of judgment, the Catch-22 depends on the bureaucracy’s
ability to manipulate language and reconstruct reality into a narrative. In The Language of War,
James Dawes reads Catch-22 in order to explore “how language functions within a system of
institutionalized violence” (162). Regarding the dislocation of referential language in the novel’s
bureaucracy, with “referential refer[ring] to the ways verbal representations are mapped … to the
material world,” Dawes argues that the novel “presents a language system in which the dictates
of authority rather than referentiality determine manner of representation….[where] moments of
description become performative speech acts” (163, 188). The difference between the descriptive
(or denotative) and performative here is crucial. In Postmodern Condition, Lyotard calls each a
“language game” between sender, addressee, and the referent—the object being represented in
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speech (9). In the denotative language game, the sender and addressee are “in the context of a
conversation … [where] the addressee is put in a position of having to give or refuse assent” over
the sender’s description of the referent, which is a dialogic speech paradigm that affords the
addressee space to judge what is said (9). For the performative, however, the meaning of the
referent “is not subject to discussion or verification on the part of the addressee,” which is a
monologic speech paradigm that does not allow the addressee to judge the referent’s meaning
(9). Thus, when a language system distorts denotative descriptions into performative utterances,
such as in Catch-22, it constructs narratives, which “themselves … have authority” rather than
the speaker (23).30 With referential descriptions transformed into narratives, anyone outside
positions of authority, such as Yossarian, can no longer make judgments about the world or
about themselves once they become objects of the narrative; the heads of the bureaucratic
structure predetermine these judgments by constructing objects into a narrative, which results in
the logical structure of the Catch-22 that inverts concepts of thought and judgment into their
opposite.31
Yossarian’s commanding officers confront him with such an ethical bind by blurring the
intersection between the guilt/innocence and complicit/critical binaries into a Catch-22, which
dislocates such concepts in order to maintain the organization’s innocence, legitimacy, and,
therefore, authority by manipulating the course of Yossarian’s service into a narrative of
brotherhood and complicity.32 After Yossarian’s repeated refusals to fly more combat missions,
the basis for the invention of the Catch-22, Colonel Korn and Colonel Cathcart offer him a deal
to send him home (430), and the content of this chapter, entitled “Catch-22,” details the military
bureaucracy’s attempt to co-opt Yossarian’s rebellion. Their first exchange represents the first
blurring of guilt and innocence in this multi-layered Catch-22: Yossarian is responsible and
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guilty for the outfit’s low morale because he refused to fly more missions rather than the fact that
the officers raise the number arbitrarily so that no one can be released from duty (430-431).33
Yossarian must accept this premise and implicitly admit his guilt if he wants to go home, and if
he does not and asserts his innocence, he will be court-martialed. However, as the last chapter,
“Yossarian,” reveals, Yossarian will inevitably be found guilty because “[i]f [he] were courtmartialed and found innocent, other men would probably refuse to fly missions, too” (453). To
ensure his guilt, the military court will charge him with “rape, extensive black-market operations,
acts of sabotage and the sale of military secrets” (452). Most of these crimes were actually
committed by Milo, and because Milo merges into the military’s bureaucratic complex (457458), imposing these actions onto Yossarian thus absolves both Milo and the bureaucracy of its
guilt. More significantly, though, this constructed narrative of guilt makes Yossarian’s only
possibility for innocence impossible, resulting in another Catch-22 because they revise the
crimes of others and apply them to Yossarian’s personal narrative.34 He will be guilty either way
despite being right when arguing that the number of missions keeps getting raised, and because
being court-martialed will not realize the aim of his rebellion—to have the officers send him
and/or his fellow pilots home and cease subjecting them to further violence because they fulfilled
their duty—the only option he has to rebel is to accept the offer.
Accepting their offer, however, produces the final Catch-22 that reconstructs his rebellion
into complicity, which explains why Korn and Cathcart seemingly acquiesce to his demand for
recognition. Colonel Korn explains the “catch” as such: “Like us. Join us. Be our pal. Say nice
things about us here and back in the States” (436). Conjoining this performative to Yossarian’s
rightful release from duty, Korn thus rewrites Yossarian’s rebellion into a narrative of solidarity
and complicity. The Catch-22 reads, “If Yossarian rebels, then he will be sent home / If he is sent
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home, then he will praise the officers and be their friends / If he praises the officers, he does not
rebel.” The logical structure voids Yossarian’s rebellion because it forces him to affirm, rather
than resist, the officer’s decision to raise the missions and keep everybody at war. In addition,
Korn expresses full awareness of the way this revision negates Yossarian’s humanist affirmation
when imploring him not “to be a fool [and] throw it all away just for a moral principle.” (437).
Yossarian also recognizes that going home and praising the officers would be “a pretty scummy
trick [he’d] be playing on the men” (437). It would effectively remove his affirmation of
dignity’s commonality from his act, localizing this right only to himself, while having him
profess the legitimacy of the officers’ decision to keep the squadron bound in perpetual war.
Thus, to go home, which would mean “his act of rebellion had succeeded” as well as affirmed
his innocence, collapses the value of his actions into their opposites, into complicity and guilt
(439). While Yossarian maintains a forgetful mental blindness to this discontinuity at the end of
“Catch-22” in the name of self-preservation, acquiescing to Korn’s Catch-22 (438), he reverses
his decision two chapters later, in “Yossarian,” declaring how he “see[s] people cashing in on
every decent impulse and every human tragedy” and decides he will run to Sweden to pursue his
moral responsibilities (455, 461). Yossarian “seeing” in his mind the violence consequent of
Milo’s and the military’s anti-humanism determines this change of course because of the
intervention of the penultimate chapter, titled “Snowden.”
Unlike Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fall, Yossarian heeds the haunting image and
memory of Snowden’s death to enable his ability to judge, and his rebellious actions against the
violence of the bureaucratic and capitalist logics represent his attempt to reconcile himself with
his conscience and make right his complicity in systemic violence. While Yossarian’s reaction to
the invasion of his conscience differs from Clamence, Catch-22’s treatment of memory parallels
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The Fall. In “Trauma and Memory in Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse-Five,” Alberto Cacicedo
posits that “Snowden’s death is never actually recollected and enacted in its full horror” until the
end of the novel because “Yossarian’s memory has worked its way around [it], giving the reader
flashes of the event…” (359). Like the woman’s suicide and the laughter of Clamence’s
conscience in The Fall, Catch-22 buries Yossarian’s memory of Snowden in its narrative and
weaves small recollections and hauntings throughout the narrative structure, but as Bill
McCarron argues in “Catch-22, Gravity’s Rainbow, and Lawlessness,” this “deja vu facing of the
Snowden death scene, numerous times but with ever-increasing clarity … allows Yossarian to
face himself” (678). “To face himself” means to engage in the two-in-one of thought, and
because of the odd narrative continuity between the chapters that book-end Yossarian’s recovery
of this memory, Heller suggests that facing his conscience is part of a continuous process, rather
than discontinuous like so many other thematic elements in the novel. This critical narrative arc
has Yossarian presented with the illusionary choice of liberating himself through complicity (like
Clamence), Yossarian next engaging in thought and purging the conventions of Milo and the
military bureaucracy, and then he chooses to rebel by escaping the system binding him. This act
of thinking, Cacicedo claims, “becomes the impetus for the ethical challenge that he takes up in
the final chapter” (360). Recalling Arendt’s theory on the relationship between thinking and
judging, Yossarian’s dialogic self-conversation through remembering Snowden’s death liberates
his faculty for judgment. For Yossarian, Snowden’s death never should have happened, and by
submitting himself to Korn’s Catch-22, the military bureaucracy will only perpetuate the
production of more dead Snowdens. Thus, his silent dialogue enables him to reject the idea of
going home, and to the notion of continuing his complicity, he says, “This is wrong.”
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Moreover, his recollection contains the two standards of judgment available to him,
which Peyton Glass’s concise reading of the chapter elucidates as “the humanistic, represented
by the dying gunner, Snowden; and the mechanistic, represented by Milo Minderbinder…” (2526). His thought thus confronts him with the choice either of negating or affirming the
normalized standard of conduct—Milo’s assertion that “[w]hat is good for M & M Enterprises is
good for the country”—that legitimates Milo’s theft of morphine from the bombers that deprives
Snowden of comfort and dignity in his last moments (Catch-22 446). Because he remembers
Snowden and converses with himself over accepting the various narratives of the military
bureaucracy or Minderbinder’s capitalism, Yossarian can judge the inhumane consequences of
following and believing in these narratives, enabling him to say no to the Milos, “Peckems,
Korns and Cathcarts” standing “[b]etween [him] and every ideal” and to change this ideal in
order to affirm the Snowden’s dignity and the ethical principle of life as he reads it in Snowden’s
entrails: “The spirit gone, man is garbage…. Ripeness was all” (454, 450). At its core, the
rebellion of proto-postmodern humanism promotes an ethic of dignified existence that combats
modernity’s systemic and legitimate violence.
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Continuities in American Literature of the Past and Present:
Constructing Postmodern Ethics
Using their literature to conduct a humanistic rebellion, the proto-postmodernists stand
between modern and postmodern positions because they neither engage in making humanism
meaningless like the counter-humanistic “linguistic turn” nor advocate for using metanarratives
of progress as a legitimating force to achieve emancipation and dignity as expressed by modern
humanists. Rather, this rebellious literature resists the consequences of humanism from a
humanist standpoint, vindicates a revised humanistic ethic of dignity and life “in the present,”
and suggests how to maintain this value without slipping into the moral blindness of modernity.
By staging this rebellion through literature, posing a limit to the violence modernity abides, these
proto-postmodern novels demonstrate how fiction has the capacity to develop a moral
philosophy as well as a third way of critiquing modernity and capitalism without resorting either
to period binaries (humanism/counter-humanism) or modernist political binaries
(Marxism/Capitalism) that reproduce the Cold War paradigm.
More than representing the novel’s rebellion against capitalist anti-humanism and its
absurd humanism, however, Yossarian’s rejection of the nationalist narrative as a functional part
of the capitalist metanarrative judges not only capitalism as illegitimate but also Lyotard’s “little
narratives” as well because of nationalism’s connection to violence. These little narratives, of
which nationalism is an instance, contrast from the totalization of metanarratives, demonstrating,
as Tony Purvis argues, “how knowledge [and legitimacy] is both decentralised and localised”
(134). While Lyotard proposes these little narratives as the “way out” of modernity’s
legitimation crisis and as a new grounding for postmodern society, Catch-22’s representation of
Yossarian’s confrontations with Milo and Korn, along with the narrative monologue of
Clamence in The Fall, show the binding and destructive power of narrative construction.
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Likewise, in “The Trials of Postmodern Discourse,” Ihab Hassan reminds us that Lyotard’s little
narratives, or “petites histoires, can prove nearly as much terrorist as Marxist totalities prove
tyrannical” (200). If even Lyotard’s atypically political theories cannot solve the problem of
legitimacy, then poststructural counter-humanism does little to provide an ethical foundation
from which one can act. As Hassan writes in the 1980s, “[E]ven Language, youngest divinity of
our intellectual clerisy, threatens to empty itself out, another god that failed,” that literary theory
gives us “no way to make sense of … our lives, immersed as [we] are in an ever-changing sea of
signifiers,” and poststructuralism “can only tease us into further thought, not anchor our
meanings” (196, 202). While valuable, poststructuralism only provides us a method, a set of
analytic tools, to understand language’s complicity in power structures. It shows how the
language of Humanism privileged “Man” over “human,” but it suggests neither standards nor
values. Rather, the poststructuralists act like the dialogic partner in modernity’s “two-in-one”:
their epistemological and linguistic theories give Western society its “purging component” that
opens the space for ethics and judgment to reemerge in a postmodern form, which the protopostmodernists anticipated in their literature and theory. Beyond the proto-postmodernists,
however, contemporary literature has begun this process of reevaluating Language and ethics.
In the introduction to Succeeding Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in
Contemporary American Literature, Mary K. Holland surveys the poststructural counterhumanism/modern humanism binary that has dominated theory in the humanities, paralleling
Linda Hutcheon’s assessment of postmodern theory as an rejection of liberal humanism (3), and
supplies evidence both for the usefulness and limits of poststructuralism. She explains that the
project of poststructural counter-humanism “[seeks] to recognize a fundamental unknowability,
particularity, and multiplicity in truth and identity that would end the marginalization,
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reductiveness, conservatism, and colonialism of humanist ways of thinking” (4). It opens our
understanding to “a more varied representation of what it means to be human than humanism
allowed,” Holland observes, but poststructuralism at its extreme also “fail[s] to recognize that
some of the goals and beliefs of humanism remain worthy and in fact crucial to the continued
production of art and literature, and perhaps even our continued humanity” (4). The transition
from language to Language—when our concept of language moves from seeing it as a
problematic in social life to conceiving it as an absolute and universal determinant, an ironic
absolute (or “fixed”) arbitrariness—perceives the central signifier of humanist thought, the
“human,” as so determined by language that the human content of the world is ruled by
“incommunicability, irrelevance, or, worst, nonexistence of meaning and real things” according
to Holland (4)—that floating signifiers, detached from a referent, reproduce themselves to the
point where their arbitrariness becomes immanent in the world.
If we recall the Cold War open/closed binary Nealon proposes in Post-Postmodernism,
then the deification of Language itself becomes closed despite its desire for openness. While its
theories on language and knowledge give us the tools to “encount[er] the text and its
representations of the human as continuous with, rather than discrete from [as the moderns
believe], the world and the culture in which they were created” (4), poststructuralism divests
language’s communicative (between people) and referential (“human” signifying a content
instead of a sign) possibilities. Poststructural theory aids in realizing not all language holds to
these qualities, as in the totalitarianism and the anti-humanist humanisms that the protopostmoderns resist, but to maintain that Foucault’s “discourse” explains knowledge in its totality
or that Baudrillard’s “simulacrum” describes the totality of the sign’s mediation in “hyperreality”
reproduces the same totalizations of modernity but with different terms. The modern, totalized
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view of language as self-expression and creation inverts to the postmodern, totalized view of
language as disconnected from the world outside structures, signs, and discourse. In either
concept of language, ethics and judgment, which deal explicitly with the particularity and
plurality of existence, are sacrificed or transformed into universals that lead to violence.
Confronted with the totalities of modern humanism, the proto-postmodernist resist with an
appeal to the right of particular, yet universal, dignity, and confronted with similar totalities in
postmodern counter-humanism, contemporary literature seeks to reconstruct human connections
through the communicability of the dignity of “human-ness” in language.
The contemporary literature that Holland discusses and the proto-postmodern literature
and theory I have analyzed share these ethical and humanistic compulsions, but because they
write in different periods—the former “after” poststructuralism and the latter prior to it—their
ethics express themselves in different ways. Written after the “linguistic turn” and the dominance
of poststructuralism in our theories of the world, contemporary humanistic literature is
“inherently and essentially poststructuralist in its assumptions about language, knowledge, and
the world—always conscious of the struggle, and specifically the struggle through language and
representation, necessary to access any version of truth” (Holland 201). The counter-humanist
tendencies of contemporary literature then coincides with the typical postmodern view, but as a
methodology or a “mode” of writing; they do not combat Humanism proper like the
poststructuralists or the proto-postmodernists. Rather, contemporary American writers maintain
the poststructural position of “the arbitrariness and problems of language, and yet still [use] this
… poststructuralism to humanist ends of generating empathy, communal bonds, ethical and
political questions, and, most basically, communicable meaning” (17). Holland’s thesis about the
contemporary turn toward humanistic thinking helps forefront the importance of the proto-
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postmodernists as the reevaluation of poststructural counter-humanism begins: despite
recognizing the validity of poststructuralist ideas about language and how it functions,
contemporary writers rebel against incommunicability and struggle to rediscover human
solidarity and dignity through language, to redefine what it means to be human, and to reinvest
belief in language’s, and particularly literature’s, communicability in the postmodern context.
While there is not enough space to cover all of Holland’s insights, her work indicates that
the postmodern “project” is entering a new phase after our confrontations with totalitarianism,
the Cold War, and postmodern disaffection. The project now is reconstructing ethical values
without resorting to monologic language and narratives, and the proto-postmodern novels and
theories, though written during the deconstruction of modernity’s humanist underpinnings in
which they took part, offer a potential postmodern ethics to ground our capacities to think, judge,
and act, a project which contemporary humanist literature carries into the future. Because
Holland and I share the conception that contemporary and proto-postmodern writers are neither
“separate from the project of modernity or of modernism, [nor] from the project of
postmodernism” (201), a reinvigoration of humanism permeates their writings. Although, these
beliefs express themselves differently—contemporary writers affirm human “truth, belief, and
knowledge” in the face of and through poststructuralist language (201), while the protopostmoderns affirm human dignity and freedom in its confrontations with and through modern
political thinking and language. Writing during the formative moments of poststructuralism, the
proto-postmodernists view truth and knowledge, especially in its communicability through
language, not as their central problematic like contemporary writers, but rather how modern
versions of truth, knowledge, and discontinuous, non-referential language produces violence.
Proto-postmodern resistance and rebellion counters modern Humanism because of their shared
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humanist value of dignity, and from this value, they believe in the self’s ability to know and to
communicate the world around itself, which is a precondition for the proto-postmodernists’
ability to judge the violence of modernity.
Like modern, liberal humanists, the proto-postmoderns believe in our capacity for
referential thought and communicative language, viewing it as a site of resistance to violence
that they take as the central problem in the worlds they represent in their novels and theories. For
these humanistic counter-humanists, discontinuous language and thought—that which is nonrepresentative of its world—abets violence. George Orwell includes an illustrating example of
the relationship of discontinuous language and violence in “Politics and the English Language”
when writing about the euphemisms used to describe Soviet terror: “People are imprisoned for
years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck, or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber
camps: This is called elimination of unreliable elements” (807). In Arendtian fashion, he says the
erasure of violence in this euphemism allows a speaker “to name things without calling up
mental pictures of them” (808). Representative thought begins with representative, referential
language that accurately names and describes the world, and from the proto-postmodern
standpoint, discontinuous language hides the real violence and immanent anti-humanism
underneath its words, doing a figurative sort of violence on the human capacity to think and
judge. Rather than acquiesce to the arbitrariness of language, the proto-postmoderns resist by
attempting to name violence as it appears in the world. The Hoenikkers dividing and distributing
ice-nine brought about the end of the world; it is a crime. The social visibility of Ellison’s
narrator depends on his humiliation; his dignity is invisible. Milo orchestrated the military action
that killed people in his own unit; he is guilty. Indeed, as Orwell writes after providing his
example of the euphemism used to describe Stalinist violence, “[I]f thought corrupts language,
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language can also corrupt thought” (808). Because of this reciprocal effect between thought and
language, the proto-postmodern novels are central to understanding the violence of scientism,
racism, and capitalism: they provide representations that run counter to traditional and
preliminary conceptions of these legitimate American ideologies, communicating how actions
and conditions refer to violence done onto human life.
Communicating the connection between these ideologies and the violence they cause, the
novels of Vonnegut, Heller, and Ellison aid us in representing in our minds the violence
underneath the language and narratives supporting unlimited progress in science and capitalism
or the othering of African-Americans that excludes them from American ideals of freedom. In
counter-humanist fashion, their novels deconstruct the discontinuity, or the absurdity, of
American Humanism and its narratives: their claims to enrich human life and dignity hollow out
in the frozen world of ice-nine, in the illuminated hole the invisible man falls into to see himself,
and in the scrawled “A Share” of the syndicate’s profits on a napkin. Moreover, the political
deconstructions of these proto-postmodern novelists rely on a belief in the commonality of
dignity because, in order to be seen as hollow and absurd, the novelists need a value from which
they can judge American Humanism. Through the use of referential representations to rebel and
say “no” to the violence abetted by Humanism, unraveling its legitimacy when compared to the
humanist ethic of dignity, their novels communicate a “limit” on unfettered adherence to
American ideologies, a belief that supports and refers to a common human value that should not
be infringed. The best expression of the commonality of dignity comes in Yossarian’s
interpretation of “Snowden’s secret” as Yossarian futilely attempted to save his life, reading that
“[r]ipeness is all” as Snowden lay dying, In this interpretative moment, Catch-22 communicates
to its readers that Snowden’s “ripeness,” his very fact of existing, is the expression of his dignity,
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and because this reading prompts Yossarian to refuse continued complicity with the Milos and
Korns of his world, the novel also communicates that dignity should be the central value against
which we should judge actions in the world outside the text. Suggesting a value in its climactic
moment of recovering memory, turning Yossarian back to remembrance and thought, the novel
crosses the boundary of fiction and becomes a site of ethical thought.
Writing about the political commitments of French existentialism, Arendt mentions how
the existentialists “look … to politics for the solution of philosophic[al] perplexities that in their
opinion resist solution or even adequate formulation in purely philosophical terms,” and she
believes their investment in politics “is why Sartre never fulfilled (or mentioned again) his
promise at the end of [Being and Nothingness] to write a moral philosophy, but, instead wrote
plays and novels…” (“European Political Thought” 437). Although Camus ought to be included
in Arendt’s assessment, her point remains: the novel is a site of exploring ethical questions and
communicating the ethical values at the foundation of our continued living in a pluralistic,
political world, and the proto-postmodern novels give us one of the most illuminating examples
of the intersection between ethics, politics, and fiction and the novel’s potential in constructing
ethics. Because judgment and political thought rely on representations of the particularities of the
world outside ourselves, the novel enables these mental faculties when we encounter the text
with already crafted representations of the world and its particulars. While all novels have this
capacity to enable our political thinking and judgment, these proto-postmodern novelists take a
further step in communicating the need for reevaluating our standards of judgment after
modernity. Like the existentialists, Vonnegut, Heller, and Ellison take the political content of
their culture as their mode of posing ethical questions, and they represent not only the absurdities
and discontinuities of Humanism but also represent “a way out” of thinking through Humanism’s
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metanarratives by representing characters who rebel against the violence Humanism supports
and who hold a truly humanistic value. Despite all three novels ending with their characters
grasping for some sort of escape—Yossarian escaping to Sweden, the invisible man
contemplating in a basement apartment, and the Jonah-esque narrator of Cat’s Cradle writing in
a cavern—their narratives compel the reader to think and to act humanistically, to break the
narrative chain of History like Brother Tarp in Invisible Man by contemplating other lives and
people presented in their narratives and conversing with them. Through the affirmation of dignity
underlying these novels, the proto-postmodernists reorient the values modernity had distorted yet
continued to profess, asking the reader to do the same as we continue to depart from modernity
and into postmodernity.
With our further understanding of the monologic nature of narratives themselves,
however, is there a guarantee that the ethics of humanism that the proto-postmodernists write
into their narratives do not slip into the same moral blindness of modernity? Fortunately, I
believe the dialogic character of texts, theorized by Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin, who is a
precursor to French poststructuralism, gives readers the necessary resistance to the mentally
binding elements of narratives. Echoing Arendt’s observation of the intersection of ethics,
politics, and literature, Geoffrey Harpham reminds us that “[w]ithin ethical theory, narrative
serves as the necessary ‘example,’ with all the possibilities of servility, deflection, deformation,
and insubordination that role implies” (401). Texts will always subvert themselves internally
through their language and externally when each interpreter encounters them. Moreover, the act
of writing fiction is itself dialogic: in “Intelligence and the Scaffold,” Camus says, “One must be
two persons when one writes” (212). The writer thus encodes their own internal dialogue, their
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two-in-one, and representative thought into his or her work, which produces part of its ethical
capacity.
Although these encodings safeguard the text from becoming another legitimation factor
in violence, we must remember that the modern philosophers who constructed Humanism’s
metanarratives in the first place produced texts. Modern philosophy’s role in Humanism and its
violence suggests one of two things: either fiction provides a better grounding for ethical thought
and values, or fiction holds the same dangers as philosophy when we consider what makes
violence legitimate. It seems this is not either/or; rather, it is and/both. As Camus introduces the
myth of Sisyphus in Myth, he recalls for us that “[m]yths are made for the imagination to breathe
life into them” (89). While we need myths and fictions to orient ourselves in the world because
they suggest standards and values in their representations and make our world more intelligible,
we also give them content, which is why we must discern and judge the values lurking between
the words and narratives we produce and read before we act. As the (meta)fictitious religion of
Bokononism in Cat’s Cradle proclaims, “All of the true things I am about to tell you are
shameless lies” (5), and so are the stories we tell ourselves.
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Notes
1

See pg. 120. Nealon prefers the word “poststructuralist” in this instance. While Andreas

Huyssen in After the Great Divide would object with this substitution (214), I believe, because
poststructuralism dominates the postmodern theoretical paradigm, this conflation describes how
we conceive at least part of the postmodern.
2

See Davies pg. 39-71. I will explore some of the contours of liberal, socialist, and what

critics typically name “anti-humanism” in the first section.
3

To identify these tendencies singularly with the American instance of 1968 is a bit

reductionist, ironically reproducing a kind of American Exceptionalism postmodernism resists.
See 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, ed. Ronald Fraser, for a comparative perspective that
demystifies Hassan’s assertion.
4

See Fraser 108 and 287-8 for some of the impetuses prompting this turn toward

structural Marxism.
5

A simple search in any library database for the phrase “Catch 22” will pull more results

out of areas such as organization studies than literary studies, and the term “invisibility,” for
example, is a central term in our discourse of justice for the homeless.
6

Part of Genter’s central thesis sees “late modernism” as distinct from “high” and

“romantic” forms of modernism, and the purpose of his book is to clarify these categories in
context of post-war American culture.
7

Lyotard defines the sublime as the result of “a conflict between the faculties of a

subject, the faculty to conceive of something and the faculty to ‘present’ something … when the
imagination fails to present an object which might … come to match a concept” (“What is
Postmodernism?” 77).
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8

Although this idea of limits is the thesis of Camus’s political thought, Arendt’s account

provides a concise description of these modern excesses.
9

See also Varon’s Bringing the War Home, pg. 101-103. Speaking of the radicalized

Weather Underground faction of the New Left, he claims that they “made violence the measure
of authenticity … champion[ing] Sartre’s provocative dictum that revolutionary violence ‘is man
re-creating himself….’” (102).
10

Arendt’s concept of “action” and Camus’s “rebellion” coincide in this view of politics

and history, although Camus’s language is less clear and concise than Arendt’s. In On Violence,
Arendt argues “the political [realm’s] … essentially human quality is guaranteed by man’s
faculty of action, the ability to begin something new” (82, emphasis added), and Camus says the
rebel acts “in terms of the obscure existence that is already made manifest in the act of
insurrection” (252, emphasis added). The emphases I have added point to the idea that all
political action, an inseparable part of our existence, imparts new realities into the common
world, as Arendt says, “whose end [we] can never foretell” (“Concept” 307).
11

See Ian H. Birchall’s “Neither Washington nor Moscow? The Rise and Fall of the

Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire” for the character of the organization. Formed in
February 1948 as an oppositional voice between the Washington-leaning French political
leadership and the Moscow-leaning French communist party, the RDR “stressed the moral aspect
of socialism,” and its dissolution predates Sartre’s support of Stalin’s USSR (365, 369).
12

See also Fraser pg. 82, which underscores Sartre’s and Camus’s influence across the Atlantic.
13

Brée explains that Camus criticized both “‘comfortable murder,’ that is, the violence of

the intellectual who calls for blood while comfortably ensconced in his study; and what he called
‘institutionalized’ violence…” (212).
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14

It would be useful to note that, even in this essay, American critics are much more

invested in answering the “postmodern” question than the French poststructuralists who
exemplify postmodern counter-humanism.
15

See Schrift’s concise biography of Lyotard in Twentieth-Century French Philosophy,

pg. 161-163.
16

See Paul Crowther’s “Les Immateriaux and the Postmodern Sublime,” A.T. Nuyen’s

“Lyotard’s Postmodern Ethics and the Normative Question,” and Peter Murphy’s “Postmodern
Perspectives and Justice.” The problem rests inherently in Lyotard’s writing, where he employs
“metadiscourse,” “metanarrative,” and “grand narrative” as a constellation of terms without
explicating their connections. This theoretical ambiguity leads Crowther, Nuyen, and Murphy
either to conflate terms or construct hierarchies that contradict the other critics, leading to wholly
different definitions and conclusions.
17

Subject in this sense is understood as the subject-object paradigm: the one who acts,

speaks, or, specifically in Lyotard’s thought, “knows.”
18

Here, Lyotard rephrases Hegel’s philosophical maxim, “What is rational is actual; And

what is actual is rational,” from Philosophy of Right without citation (10).
19

Davies explains, using Lyotard’s language and concepts, that Hegelian Idealism “seeks

the totality and autonomy of knowledge, and stresses understanding rather than freedom as the
key to human fulfilment and emancipation” (27).
20

A short caveat on Camus’s anti-rationalism: when Camus implicates modern logicality,

he does not elevate pure irrationalism to take its place. Rather, he wants to show how the
question of suicide and the world’s fundamental irrationality frustrates rational thought and
demonstrates logicality’s limits, namely because it leads to its opposite—the deification of the
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irrational and meaninglessness (the Absurd). Although he wants to say his “reasoning developed
in [Myth] leaves out altogether the most widespread spiritual attitude of our enlightened age: the
one, based on the principle that all is reason, which aims to explain the world,” it seems to me
the enlightenment assumptions about reason are exactly what he targets. See Myth 24-5, 31-2 for
a further look into philosophical suicide and Srigley 39-42 for its connection to violence. Also
see Duran, pg. 368-9, who perceives the parallels between Myth and Rebel as well.
21

According to Bowker, this passion “include[s] the imperative to decenter and disrupt

subjectivities, the obsession with the ethical primacy and sanctity of the other, the valorization of
loss, grief, and mourning as constituents of political life, and individuals’ and communities’
profound identifications with the status of victim” (xvi). The first two “postmodern imperatives”
seem fairly commonsensical (though spun in an anti-postmodern fashion), but “valorization of
loss” and “identifications with the status of victims” only make sense in his maladapted
framework based on a fundamental misreading of absurdity.
22

See Invisible Man, pg. 16. For this discussion, the most important line reads, “I want

you to overcome ‘em with yeses, undermine ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and
destruction….”
23

See Johnson, pg. 303, 305, for the inextricable link between capitalism and slavery

despite Marx’s claim that this “feudal” mode of production was “superseded” by capitalism.
24

Camus defines metaphysical rebellion as “the movement by which man protests against

his condition and against the whole of creation” (Rebel 23).
25

See Pasco and Roberts. Most literary analyses take the monologic structure of the

novel as a given, but as David Ellison notes, the novel is “constructed [either] as a dialogue in
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which only one voice is heard, [or] as a dialogue that may be the imaginary projection of one
monomaniacal consciousness” (179).
26

See David Ellison, pg. 187-188. He untangles the jumbled events Clamence presents

into a very intelligible and compartmentalized version of The Fall’s linear chronology.
27

In The Rebel, Camus defines terror as “an interminable subjectivity which is imposed

on others as objectivity” (243), which Jean-Baptiste enacts when he imposes his portrait of guilt
onto his listener, binding them in his guilt’s objectivity and universality. See Daniel Just’s “From
Guilt to Shame: Albert Camus and Literature’s Ethical Response to Politics,” pg. 888-902, for a
more in depth analysis of the connections between Clamence’s logic of guilt and terror as well as
what Camus suggests as a more dialogic grounding for ethics.
28

In Catch-22, this logical structure operates on the assumption that “a concern for one’s

own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational
mind” (47). This proposition is almost impossible to refute, which gives this logical trap its
power.
29

As in the above case, Clamence’s assumption that guilt is universal is hard to refute if

we detach it from Camus’s existential implications and the extreme justifications it affords
Clamence: we have all been guilty at one time or another, whether or not we lived with a bad
conscience afterward.
30

In Postmodern Condition, Lyotard describes the narrative as being reliant on

performative utterances, which subsume all other “language games”: “[The narrative] determines
in a single stroke what one must say in order to be heard, what one must listen to in order to
speak, and what role one must play … to be the object of a narrative” (21).
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31

See Apostolos Doxiadis’s “Narrative, Rhetoric, and the Origins of Logic,” pg. 77-78,

96-97, where he argues that logic emerged out of narrative and mythic modes.
32

See Arendt’s “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” pg. 149-150, for the way

totalitarianism blurs this binary in its systematized murder.
33

In the structure of a Catch-22, this reads, “If morale is low, then the officers are guilty

for raising the number of missions / If they raised the number of missions, then Yossarian refuses
to fly / If Yossarian refuses to fly, then the officers are not guilty for raising the number of
missions.” Subsequent Catch-22s in this paragraph will be footnoted in this format for
clarification.
34

“If Yossarian is innocent, he will not go home / If he does not go home, he is court-

martialed / If he is court-martialed, he is not innocent.”
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